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Chapter Seventeen
Habeas Corpus Unbound1
Sheila Wildeman, Dalhousie University
[This is a draft of a chapter accepted for publication by Emond Publishing in the
forthcoming book Administrative Law in Context, 4e, edited by Colleen M Flood & Paul
Daly, due for publication in 2021].
I.

Introduction

One could teach all of administrative law through the lens of prison law, for incarceration
is constituted not simply by walls, nor by a single triggering legal order, but by a web of
decisions made by officials—from security classifications and transfers, to institutional
discipline, to use of force and isolation, to apportioning access to phones, visits, health
care, exercise, nutritious food, spiritual practices, and parole. Prison is the administrative
state in miniature. Of course, while prisons may serve as concentrated illustrations of
administrative law in action, they are also exceptional spaces. Rationalized as
mechanisms of justly apportioned deprivation of liberty, they sit at the sharpest point of
the state, where law is most apt to take expression as violence: strip searches, “pain
compliance,”2 use of weapons, solitary confinement, and more. To be sure, prisons are
not the only sites of incarceration in the contemporary administrative state. Immigration
detention centres and secure psychiatric wards are obvious examples of other places
where state-backed deprivation of liberty, and attendant subjection to authorized and
unauthorized violent incapacitation, occurs.3 To these, we may add an array of
institutions troubling the borders of control and care4 and sometimes also the borders of

The title borrows from Part III (“Habeas Corpus: Bound and Unbound”) of Paul D Halliday’s Habeas
Corpus: From England to Empire (London: Belknap Press, 2010). Thanks to Dylan Gogan for sharing
his inside knowledge of habeas corpus with me over the summer and fall of 2020. See El Jones, “A
Prisoner on Prisons: Habeas Corpus in a Nutshell” (29 October 2017), online: Halifax Examiner
\<https://www.halifaxexaminer.ca/featured/a-prisoner-on-prisons-habeas-corpus-in-a-nutshell\>
(describing a 2017 habeas corpus workshop led by Gogan and concluding with a poem he wrote on
his experiences as a self-represented applicant.) I hope that readers will pay close attention to the
judgments bearing Gogan’s name herein and think on his and other prisoners’ accomplishments
under the most challenging circumstances. This chapter is dedicated to him. Thanks also to research
assistants Audrey Axten and Zach Geldert, and to my colleagues at East Coast Prison Justice Society,
Elizabeth Fry Societies (NS Mainland and Cape Breton) and the Canadian Prison Law Association
from whom I am always learning.
2 West Coast Prison Justice Society & Prisoners’ Legal Services, Damage/Control:
Use of Force and the Cycle of Violence and Trauma in BC’s Federal and Provincial Prisons (Law
Foundation of BC, 2019) at 10. [West Coast Prison Justice Society, “Damage/Control”].
3 Laura Johnston, “Operating in Darkness”: BC’s Mental Health Act Detention System (Vancouver:
Community Legal Assistance Society, 2017); C Tess Sheldon, Karen R Spector, & Mercedes Perez, “ReCentring Equality: The Interplay Between Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter in Challenges to
Psychiatric Detention (2016) 35:2 NJCL 193.
4 Sheldon et al, ibid; L Ben-Moshe, C Chapman and AC Carey, eds, Disability Incarcerated:
Imprisonment and Disability in the United States and Canada (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
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public and private action—for instance, residential care facilities, nursing homes, and
group homes.5
Sites of incarceration present stress tests to our theories and practices of administrative
law. They yield insights, too, into how law distributes power across the administrative
state. While studying administrative law as prison law reveals certain distinctions
between the law that rules in prisons and everyday administrative state operations, it also
reveals continuities—for instance, between the surveillance and control characterizing
prisons and the routine surveillance and control that police, child welfare, social
assistance, mental health, and public health authorities concentrate upon Indigenous,
Black, disabled, and poor people in ways that produce and reproduce subordination and
disproportionate incarceration.6 We begin to see that deprivation of liberty behind prison
walls is continuous with patterns of social control and material deprivation distributed
across populations in systematically unequal ways. The question is, what if any resources
does administrative law have to respond?
This chapter offers a glimpse of how lawyers may use their skills in contexts of carceral
administration. Building on Cristie Ford’s introduction to administrative and judicial
review remedies,7 its focus is the “great writ” of habeas corpus: “the strongest tool a
prisoner has to ensure that the deprivation of his or her liberty is not unlawful.”8 Habeas
corpus is designed to provide swift access to judicial oversight of the legality of detention
and to deliver an effective remedy: release from the illegal detention. For prisoners,
access to justice (albeit narrowly conceived) often means access to habeas corpus. Yet
one need not be embroiled in battling the carceral state to get something out of habeas
corpus. For the student simply seeking review of basic principles of administrative law,
habeas corpus provides an opportunity for reinforcement of essential features of doctrine,
including procedural fairness and substantive legality.
II. Prisons: Plenty of Rules, not Much Rule of Law9
Ibid.
See e.g. Robyn Maynard, Policing Black Lives: State Violence in Canada from Slavery to the Present
(Black Point NS: Fernwood, 2017); Amy Alberton et al, “Intersection of Indigenous Peoples and
Police: Questions About Contact and Confidence” (2019) 61:4 Can J Criminology and Criminal Justice
101; Ontario Human Rights Commission, A Disparate Impact: second interim report on the inquiry into
racial profiling and racial discrimination of Black persons by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto:
Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2020); Fiona Kouyoumdjian et al, “Interactions between Police
and Persons Who Experience Homelessness and Mental Illness in Toronto, Canada: Findings from a
Prospective Study” (2019) 64:10 Can J Psychiatry 718.
7 See Cristie Ford, Chapter 2.
8 Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24 at para 29 [Khela].
9 I am borrowing the title of a panel hosted by now-Senator Kim Pate, “Prisons: Lots of Rules, Not
Much Rule of Law” Sallows Fry Conference, University of Saskatchewan (College of Law), Saskatoon,
(May 2015) online (video): \<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiNEGbK6qwM\> (panelists Lisa
Neve, Yvonne Johnson, Sheila Wildeman) [“Not Much Rule of Law”]. The panel was in turn inspired
by statements of Louise Arbour (Commission of Inquiry into certain events at the Prison for Women in
Kingston (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1996) [Arbour Report] at part
3.1.2, describing the culture of force and impunity at the Prison for Women: “The rule of law is
absent, although rules are everywhere.”
5
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Let us begin with the context from which most Canadian habeas corpus law originates:
incarceration due to criminalization. In Canada, federal prisons10 confine persons
sentenced to two years or more while provincial-territorial jails hold those sentenced to
under two years and persons remanded pre-trial. (Up to 75 percent of those in provincialterritorial jails are there pre-trial, a statistic explained in part by judicial interim release
conditions ensuring the most marginalized are “set up to fail.”11) Persons subject to
immigration detention may be held in dedicated detention centres or provincial-territorial
jails.12
Demographically, imprisonment correlates with several indicia of social subordination—
Indigeneity, racialization,13 mental health disability,14 poverty, homelessness, low
educational and employment attainment, the list goes on.15 These (often interlocking)
oppressions are especially concentrated among incarcerated women.16 To offer but one
example of relentlessly dispiriting statistics, while Indigenous people made up 4.5
percent of the Canadian population in 2018-2019, 29 percent of federally sentenced
persons—and a full 41 percent of federally sentenced women—were Indigenous. In
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where 16 percent and 14 percent of the population,
respectively, are Indigenous, 75 percent of those in provincial custody are Indigenous.17
Canada’s prisons, like those other colonial state mechanisms—reserves and residential
schools—work together with other institutions, policies, and cultural norms to

While technically “prison” designates the federal domain, at times I use it colloquially herein.
Abby Deshman & Nicole Myers, Set up to Fail: Bail and the Revolving Door of Pre-Trial Detention,
(Toronto: Canadian Civil Liberties and Education Trust, 2014).
12 In 2019-2020, 8,825 people were in immigration detention in Canada, with 1/3 in provincial jails,
RCMP lockup, or other prison settings, and the rest in Immigration Holding Centres. See Canada
Border Services Agency, “Annual Detention, Fiscal Year 2019 to 2020” (2020), online:
\<https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/detent/stat-2019-2020-eng.html\>; Stephanie J
Silverman & Petra Molnar, “Everyday Injustices: Barriers to Access to Justice for Immigration
Detainees in Canada” (2016) 35:1 Refugee Survey Q 109.
13 Correctional Investigator of Canada, Annual Report 2014-2015 (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional
Investigator, 2015) [OCI Annual Report, 2014-2015] at 2-3. (“The federal incarceration rate for Blacks
is three times their representation rate in general society”).
14 Correctional Service Canada, Prevalence of Mental Health Disorders Among Incoming Federal
Offenders: Atlantic, Ontario, & Pacific Regions (Ottawa: CSC, 2013); National Prevalence of Mental
Disorders among Federally Sentenced Women Offenders: In Custody Sample (Ottawa: CSC, April 2018)
[Mental Disorders Among Federally Sentenced Women].
15 See, e.g., Fiona Kouyoumdjian et al, “Health Status of Prisoners in Canada: Narrative Review”
(2016) 62 Can Fam Physician 215.
16 See e.g. Mental Disorders Among Federally Sentenced Women, supra note 14; OCI Annual Report,
2014-15, supra note 13 at 3; C Bodkin et al, “History of Childhood Abuse in Populations Incarcerated
in Canada: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis” (2019) 109:3 Am J Public Health E1; Shoshana
Pollock, Locked In, Locked Out: Imprisoning Women in the Shrinking and Punitive Welfare State
(Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University, 2008).
17 Statistics Canada, Adult and Youth Correctional Statistics 2018/2019, by Jamil Malakieh (2020),
online: \<https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2020001/article/00016-eng.htm\>.
10
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systematically subject Indigenous people to forced dislocation, deprivation of the social
determinants of health, and attacks on the foundations of political identity and authority.18
Linking population-wide patterns of incarceration to colonialist and other socialstructural violence19 is fundamental to the study and practice of prison law–which, like all
administrative law, should start with an assessment of whether or how law’s proposed
solutions respond to a given problem. To further orient ourselves to the subject of
incarceration we must turn to the conditions and treatment experienced behind bars. We
start with an observation from Lisa Kerr:20 courts embrace the principle that a custodial
sentence consists of a rationally apportioned period of social separation, yet this misses
the qualitative dimension and its variability.21 In reality, confinement differs both among
and within prisons, and among prisoners. That is, in practice, the penal sentence is meted
out in degrees: from assignment to a shared or single cell, to subjection to official or
unofficial force (beatings, rape22), to exposure to filth or extreme heat or cold, to isolation
with or without a mattress or clothes. Overseeing these qualitative dimensions falls not to
judges but to other officials. Yet while prison administration has attracted utmost
deference from judges on review,23 successive independent inquiries suggest chronic
problems punctuated by episodic events of spectacular brutality.
Among the persistent concerns expressed by oversight bodies are: 1) practices of
prolonged and indeterminate isolation;24 2) use of force not justified in the
circumstances25 (what justification means in prisons is, as we will see, vexed); 3) lack of
N Macdonald, “Canada’s Prisons Are the New Residential Schools,” Macleans (2016), online:
\<www.macleans.ca/news/canada/canadas-prisons-are-the-new-residential-schools\>; Remarks of
Yvonne Johnson, “Not Much Rule of Law,” supra note 9 at mins 11:20–19:00, 1:04:14–1:06:50.
19 See Zinzi D Bailey et al, “How Structural Racism Works—Racist Policies as a Root Cause of US
Racial Health Inequities” (2021) 384:8 New Eng J Med 768. Theauthors’ definition of “structural
racism” (at 768) assists:
[R]acism is not simply the result of private prejudices held by individuals, but is also
produced and reproduced by laws, rules, and practices, sanctioned and even
implemented by various levels of government, and embedded in the economic system
as well as in cultural and societal norms”
Structural “violence” is a term that centres moral responsibility for the suffering, debilitation, and
death that results from structural inequality. See e.g. Paul Farmer, “An Anthropology of Structural
Violence” (2004) 45:3 Current Anthropology 305 at 307-09, 317.
20 Lisa Kerr, “How the Prison Is a Black Box in Punishment Theory” (2018) 69:1 UTLJ 85; “Sentencing
Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of Punishment” (2017) 32:3 CJLS 187 at 200.
21 Solosky v The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 821, 1979 CanLII 9 at 839 [Solosky].
22 Correctional Investigator of Canada, Press Release, “2019-20 Annual Report of the Correctional
Investigator of Canada Tabled in Parliament Report Shines Light on Sexual Coercion and Violence
behind Bars” (27 October 2020), online: \<https://www.ocibec.gc.ca/cnt/comm/press/press20201027-eng.aspx\>.
23 Lisa Kerr, “The Chronic Failure to Control Prisoner Isolation in US and Canadian Law” (2015)
40:2 Queen’s LJ 483.
24 Solitary confinement—and the continuing effort to eradicate it through law and litigation—is
discussed below and again at various points in the chapter.
25 West Coast Prison Justice Society, “Damage/Control” supra note 2; Correctional Investigator of
Canada, 2018-2019 Annual Report (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2019) at 38–39;
André Marin, The Code, (Ontario: Office of the Ombudsman, June 2013).
18
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access to health care;26 4) overcrowding, lack of hygiene and of privacy;27 and 5) evasion
of public and legal accountability for all of the above.28 To return to the theme of
inequitable distribution, prisoners who are Indigenous or Black, and those who have
serious mental health conditions, are disproportionately subject to use of force and
isolation in prisons,29 while gender/gender identity (including rigid norms of dominant
masculinity) further shapes and channels the pathways of institutional violence.30
Carceral studies scholars suggest that these are inevitable outcomes of “carceral
logics”31—reliance on confinement and control to shore up gross material and social
inequality while effecting self-righteous legitimation of the existing order. Carceral logics
provoke resistance and respond by intensifying and justifying restrictions. The endpoint
Correctional Investigator of Canada, 2019-20 Annual Report (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional
Investigator, 2020) at 51-66; Adam Miller, “Prison Health Care Inequality” (2013) 185(6) CMAJ 249.
27 See e.g. Correctional Investigator of Canada, “Priority: Conditions of Confinement” and list of
reports: online \< https://www.oci-bec.gc.ca/cnt/priorities-priorites/confinement-eng.aspx\>;
Auditor General of Ontario, Annual Report 2019, vol 3, Ch 1 at 16-20 (Ontario: Queen’s Printer, 2019);
R v Persad, 2020 ONSC 188; R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26 at para 2. These problems have been
magnified by COVID-19: see Adelina Iftene, “COVID-19 in Canadian Prisons: Policies, Practices and
Concerns” in Colleen Flood et al, eds, Vulnerable: The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19 (Ottawa: U
Ottawa Press, 2020).
28 See e.g. Jane Sprott & Anthony Doob, “Solitary Confinement, Torture, and Canada’s Structured
Intervention Units” (2021), online: \<https://johnhoward.ca/drs-doob-sprott-report\>; Ontario
Human Rights Commission, “Statement: OHRC files motion to address Ontario’s breach of legal
obligation to keep prisoners with mental health disabilities out of segregation” online:
/<http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/news_centre/statement-ohrc-files-motion-addressontario%E2%80%99s-breach-legal-obligation-keep-prisoners-mental-health>/; Correctional
Investigator of Canada, Fatal Response: An Investigation into the Preventable Death of Matthew Hines
(Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2017).
29 Tom Cardozo, “Bias Behind Bars: A Globe Investigation Finds a Prison System Stacked Against
Black and Indigenous Inmates.“ Globe and Mail (Oct 24, 2020); Interim Report of the Standing Senate
Committee on Human Rights, Study on the Human Rights of Federally-Sentenced Persons: The Most
Basic Human Right is to be Treated as a Human Being (Ottawa: Senate, 2019) at 50-56 [“Senate
Interim Report”]; Mandy Wesley, Marginalized: The Aboriginal Women’s Experience in Federal
Corrections (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2012); Correctional Investigator of Canada, A Case Study of
Diversity in Corrections: The Black Inmate Experience in Federal Penitentiaries (Ottawa: Office of the
Correctional Investigator, 2014); Risky Business: An Investigation of the Treatment and Management
of Chronic Self-Injury Among Federally Sentenced Women (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional
Investigator, 2013); Laura Dellazizzo et al, “Is Mental Illness Associated with Placement into Solitary
Confinement in Correctional Settings? A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis” (2020) 29:4 Int’l J
Mental Health Nursing 576; John Howard Society Fact Sheet 31 (2017): “Solitary Confinement”
online: \<https://johnhoward.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Solitary-ConfinementFactSheet-Final-1.pdf>\.
30 See Wesley, ibid; Risky Business, ibid; Yvonne Boyer et al, "First Nations, Metis, and Inuit Prisoners'
Rights to Health within the Prison System: Missed Opportunities" (2019) 13:1 McGill J L & Health 27;
Heather Lawson, Decriminalizing Race: The Case for Investing in Community and Social Support for
Imprisoned Racialized Women in Canada (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Sept 2020);
Yvonne Boyer et al, “Vulnerable Targets: Trans Prisoner Safety, the Law, and Sexual Violence in the
Prison System” (2019) 31 CJWL 386.
31 Michelle Brown & Judith Schept, “New abolition, criminology and a critical carceral studies” (2017)
19:4 Punishment & Society 440; Debra Parkes, “Solitary Confinement, Rights Litigation and the
Possibility of a Prison Abolitionist Lawyering Ethic” (2017) 32:2 CJLS 165 [“Abolitionist Lawyering”]
at 179.
26
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is solitary confinement. This is defined as isolation for 22 hours or more per day without
meaningful social interaction. Prolonged solitary confinement for 15 days or more
constitutes torture, according to international human rights bodies.32 The Court of Appeal
for Ontario has ruled that “administrative segregation,” a federal regime of prolonged and
indeterminate solitary confinement, was cruel and unusual treatment contrary to s 12 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.33 Both the Ontario and BC Courts of
Appeal have held that this regime infringed s 7.34 In these judgments and others, courts
have accepted that prolonged solitary confinement—and solitary confinement for any
period for those with mental health conditions exacerbated by the practice—poses
“significant risk of serious psychological harm, including mental pain and suffering, and
increased incidence of self-harm and suicide.”35 The response of the correctional service
to these rulings has been a restructuring that has left the underlying practices significantly
intact, continuing solitary under other names.36
This context must inform our study of habeas corpus and, more generally, our
understanding of Canada’s administrative state and its fit with the rule of law. In its most
concentrated form, the rule of law reduces to the idea that the exercise of public power
must find its source in law.37 Habeas corpus epitomizes a Diceyan vision of the rule of
law, which regards the administrative branch with suspicion (particularly where
individual liberties are at stake) and vindicates the right of subjects to access the ordinary
law in the ordinary courts. In contrast, Canadian administrative law has embraced an antiDiceyan rule of law ideal of a culture of justification fostered by all three branches—
including state officials understood to be able and willing to exercise discretion in ways
that are responsive to the public they serve.38
It is far from clear that any model of the rule of law can co-exist with, or survive, the
culture of militarized authority governing life in Canada’s prisons and jails, where state
coercion most demands law’s legitimation. Four critiques internal to the rule of law come
United Nations, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules),
UNGAOR, 70th Sess, UN Doc A/Res/70/175 (2015), [Mandela Rules] rules 43-45.
33 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter]; Canadian Civil Liberties Association v Canada, 2019
ONCA 243 [CCLA] at paras 82-126. In Francis v Ontario, 2020 ONSC 1644, Perell J held that any period
of administrative segregation of persons with serious mental illness constitutes cruel and unusual
treatment under s 12, not saved by s 1 (at paras 313-15, 327-47); upheld in Francis v Ontario, 2021
ONCA 197.
34 CCLA, ibid; British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v Canada (AG), 2018 BCSC 62 [BCCLA (SC)],
var’d 2019 BCCA [BCCLA (CA)].
35 BCCLA (SC), ibid at paras 180 & 247.
36 See Sprott & Doob, supra note 28; Justice David Cole, Final Report of the Independent Reviewer on
the Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General’s Compliance with the 2013 “Jahn Settlement Agreement”
and the Terms of the Consent Order of January 16, 2018 Issued by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
(Ontario, February 25, 2020): “[P]rolonged segregation (15 days or longer) remains a routine
practice for individuals with mental health and/or suicide risk alerts on file,” at Table 8, online:
\<https://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/Corrections/JahnSettlement/FinalReportIndependentR
eviewer.html#background\>.
37 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 1998 CanLII 793 at para 71.
38 On the rule of law as conceived by Albert Venn Dicey, Lon Fuller and others, with special attention
to the implications for administrative law, see Chapter 3 by Mary Liston.
32
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to mind, to be revisited at the chapter’s end. The first draws on administrative law’s ruleof-law ideal of public justification. Prisons resist this—or rather, they play on risk
rationalization and dominant sentiments of “just deserts” to legitimize discretionary
deprivation and force.39 The second is a related idea, from Lon Fuller: the rule of law
demands congruence between law on the books and law’s application. In this regard, the
historical record suggests ongoing defiance and recalcitrance from prison administration.
The third draws on the principle of equality before the law—interpreted for our purposes
as substantive equality. Prisons are vectors of state brutality disproportionately done to
Indigenous, Black, poor and disabled persons with special compounded harms based on
gender/gender identity. Fourth and last, while the foundation of the democratic rule of
law in the social contract tradition is popular consent, prisons perpetuate the violence,
dislocation, and deprivation of colonialist rule. For Indigenous People living in—or in the
shadow of—prison, the rule of law (as Yvonne Johnson, a Cree woman serving a life
sentence, put it), is “bullshit.”40
The critical foundational question for prison law is: how much evidence of chronic and
systematic betrayal of the rule of law (or of professed rule-of-law values) is needed
before an institution loses its claim to legitimacy and thereby its claim to the respect and
obedience of legal subjects? Indeed, how much does it take for an institution to
delegitimize the state as a whole? It is with this question in mind that we take up the great
writ: its origins, functions, and limitations.
III.

A Too-Brief History of Habeas Corpus

While the foundations of habeas corpus may be traced to the Magna Carta,41 it was not
until the 17th century that it assumed its form as a remedy that prisoners might use
against the state.42 In 1627 in Darnel’s Case,43 five nobles detained for refusal to pay a
forced loan to Charles I used the writ to challenge their detention. They were
unsuccessful, but the case prompted parliamentary action confirming that deprivation of
liberty must be justified in law.44 Habeas corpus migrated to Canada with settlement and
the passing of inherent jurisdiction to Canada’s superior courts.

Kelly Hannah-Moffat, “Criminogenic Need and the Transformative Risk Subject: Hybridizations of
Risk/Need in Penality.” (2004) 7(1) Punishment and Society 2; Debra Parkes, "The Punishment
Agenda in the Courts" (2014) 67 SCLR (2d) 589.
40 Statements of Yvonne Johnson in “Not Much Rule of Law,” supra note 9 at 11:20–19:00; 1:04:14–
1:06:50; see also Yvonne Johnson (with Rudy Wiebe), Stolen Life: The Journey of a Cree Woman
(Toronto: Alfred Knopf, 1998).
41 On the “brilliant sleight of hand” through which habeas corpus and the Magna Carta were “fused …
together for the purposes of political argument,” see Halliday, supra note 1 at 15-18.
42 Judith Farbey & Robert Sharpe, Simon Atrill, The Law of Habeas Corpus, 3rd ed (London: Oxford UP,
2011) at 2-3; see also Khela, supra note 8 at para 27; Halliday, supra, note 1 at 29 ff.
43 (1627) 3 St Tr 1, 59 (KB). See Linda Popofsky, “Habeas Corpus and ‘Liberty of the Subject’: Legal
Arguments for the Petition of Right in the Parliament of 1628” (1979) 41:2 The Historian 257.
44 Farbey et al, supra note 42 at 8-12.
39
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The contemporary foundation of habeas corpus law in Canada is wedded to the prison
context, specifically the principle that prisoners are entitled to maximum liberty
consistent with their sentence, stated in case law in 198045 and later codified in the
Corrections and Conditional Release Act.46 Two Supreme Court of Canada certiorari
cases are foundational. In 1978, Nicholson v Haldimand-Norfolk Regional Police
Commissioners introduced a context-sensitive duty of procedural fairness reaching
further into the administrative state than had older models of “natural justice,”47 and soon
thereafter Martineau v Matsqui Disciplinary Board affirmed that this duty applied to
prison discipline.48 On this point, Dickson CJ in concurrence stated that where a prisoner
is committed to “a ‘prison within a prison’ … elementary justice requires some
procedural protection.” He added: the “rule of law must run within penitentiary walls.”49
Two years later, habeas corpus was constitutionalized in s 10(c) of the Charter:
“Everyone has the right on arrest or detention … to have the validity of the detention
determined by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the detention is not lawful.”50
Cases have since recognized that s 10(c) interacts with at least three further rights: s 7
(not to be deprived of liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice), s 9 (no arbitrary detention or imprisonment), and s 12 (no cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment).51 The writ also functions as a s 24(1) remedy.52
The modern law on habeas corpus in Canada was launched with the Miller trilogy of
1985.53 These cases involved federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus in provincial
superior courts. The Federal Courts Act54 assigns the Federal Court exclusive jurisdiction
to issue certiorari in respect of “a federal board, commission or other tribunal”55—but no
power to issue habeas corpus except in certain contexts involving the Canadian Forces.
When a decision involving deprivation of liberty is made by a prison official, an
application for certiorari in Federal Court is an avenue to attack that decision (and have it
quashed). But is it the only avenue? A central question in the trilogy was whether
provincial superior courts could issue habeas corpus56 in respect of federal correctional
Solosky, supra note 21 at 839.
SC 1992, c 20, [CCRA], ss 4(d) & 28.
47 [1979] 1 SCR 311, 1978 CanLII 24 [Nicholson].
48
[1980] 1 SCR 602, 1979 CanLII 184 [Martineau].
49 Ibid at 622.
50 Charter, supra note 33, s 10(c).
51 See Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina, 2019 SCC 29 at para 21 [Chhina];
R v Gamble, [1988] 2 SCR 595, 1988 CanLII 15 [Gamble] at para 74.
52 Gamble, ibid at paras 64-66 & 81.
53 R v Miller, [1985] 2 SCR 613, 1985 CanLII 22 [Miller], Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution, [1985]
2 SCR 643, 1985 CanLII 23 [Cardinal], and Morin v Shu Review Committee, [1985] 2 SCR 662, 1985
CanLII 24.
54 RSC 1985, c F-7.
55 Ibid, s 18(1)(a).
56 More fully stated, what was in issue was the ability of the superior courts to grant federal prisoners
habeas corpus with “certiorari in aid.” In this context, the latter phrase denotes a demand to deliver
up the record, not the remedial power to quash and remit for reconsideration. See Miller, supra note
53, at paras 13-14; Khela, supra note 8 at paras 35-38.
45
46
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officials. Miller affirmed that the superior courts did have this power and that extrinsic
evidence might be brought in support.57 Further, it affirmed that prisoners may use
habeas corpus to test restrictions on their “residual liberties.”58 That is, Miller recognized
that “there may be significant degrees of deprivation of liberty within a penal
institution”—for instance, confinement in a designated restrictive unit—and that these
differences in degree may be enough to trigger habeas corpus. The remedy was stated as
release from the unlawful detention “into normal association with the general inmate
population.”59
A second case in the trilogy, Cardinal v Director of Kent Institution,60 applied habeas
corpus to a superintendent’s decision to maintain the applicants in segregation despite a
review board’s recommendation they be released. The judgment gave specificity to the
context-sensitive duty of fairness articulated in Nicholson and Martineau and voided the
applicants’ segregation based on lack of notice or a right to respond.
Yet there was a setback following a 1990 Supreme Court decision, Steele v Mountain
Institution.61 There, the Court granted habeas corpus to an applicant held on an
indeterminate sentence for 37 years, on the basis that the Parole Board had misapplied
statutory criteria such that Steele remained incarcerated “far beyond the time he …
should have been properly paroled”; this was cruel and unusual punishment under s 12 of
the Charter. However, the Court concluded by observing that if not for the age of the
applicant and his prolonged journey through the courts, it would have insisted on his
seeking certiorari in the Federal Court (in turn requiring exhaustion of internal appeals)
instead of habeas corpus, for it “would be wrong to sanction the establishment of a costly
and unwieldly [sic] parallel system for challenging a Parole Board decision.”62 That
statement was amplified in rulings circumscribing the availability of habeas corpus in
matters reaching well beyond parole for the next 15 years.63
In 2005, May v Ferndale Institution reversed this trend.64 It revived the reasoning from
the trilogy, consolidating a set of justifications for recognizing the jurisdiction of the
superior courts to deal with habeas corpus in matters also amenable to review in Federal
Court. These included the importance of giving prisoners their choice of forum, the
comparative timeliness of access to habeas corpus, and the shift in the onus of proof to
prison authorities (discussed below).65 The Supreme Court again affirmed the importance
of access to habeas corpus nine years later, in Mission Institution v Khela—adding that
Miller, ibid at paras 23-26.
Ibid at paras 32-35.
59 Ibid at paras 32-33.
60 Supra note 53.
61 [1990] 2 SCR 1385, 1990 CanLII 50.
62 Ibid at 1412, 1418.
63 See Debra Parkes, "The 'Great Writ' Reinvigorated? Habeas Corpus in Contemporary Canada"
(2012) 36:1 Man LJ 351 at 355-56; Allan Manson, "The Effect of Steele on Habeas Corpus and
Indeterminate Confinement" (1990) 80 Criminal Reports (3d) 282.
64 2005 SCC 82 [May].
65 Ibid at paras 66-72. See also Khela, supra note 8 at paras 43-49. However, courts continue to regard
the parole regime as unsuitable for habeas corpus challenge; see section IV.A, below.
57
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habeas corpus may be sought on grounds of unreasonableness (in addition to the
traditional bases of proving illegality, namely lack of jurisdiction or procedural
unfairness).66 Some worried that this would weaken habeas corpus given the harnessing
of reasonableness to deference (see Chapters 11 and 12). However, we will see below
that reasonableness opens new terrain for prisoner challenges—particularly, post-Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov.67 Recently, in Chhina, the Court
further narrowed the already-slim bases for judicial discretion not to deal with habeas
corpus.68 Thus, it appears that since 2005 habeas corpus has been on the upswing in
terms of increasing prisoner access to the courts.69
IV. Habeas Corpus: Doctrine
A. Preliminaries
Habeas corpus offers advantages over other common law writs, including: 1) rapid
access to the courts,70 2) near absence of judicial discretion to refuse relief, 3) a prisonerfriendly onus of proof, and 4) a robust remedy. On the first point, habeas corpus takes
priority over other court business. Once the application is filed, court rules typically
require a hearing within seven days (this may, for instance, be a motion for directions),
with any subsequent hearings to be convened with dispatch.71
On the second point, while judges may decline to issue habeas corpus on grounds of
mootness, they lack the discretion they enjoy on judicial review to refuse to deal with a
matter based on failure to exhaust alternatives.72 Once the prisoner meets the first step of
the test (discussed below), the court must proceed, with two narrow exceptions:
where (1) a statute such as the Criminal Code … confers jurisdiction on a court of
appeal to correct the errors of a lower court and release the applicant if need be or
Khela, ibid at para 72.
2019 SCC 65, [Vavilov].
68 Chhina, supra note 51.
69 See, however, the remedies section at the chapter’s end on recent efforts of some courts to curtail
applications, for instance through vexatious litigant status and the awarding of costs.
70 See Chhina, supra note 51 paras 66-67. But see e.g. Brown v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2020 FCA 130 at paras 157-58 [Brown]:
a cursory review of Federal Court jurisprudence with respect to detention review
demonstrates that applications for judicial review are often heard and disposed of in
the Federal Court on an urgent basis. … I agree with my colleague, Justice Stratas […]
that the “factual spin and speculation about the procedural flexibility, innovative
capability and remedial effectiveness of the Federal Courts … [is] false and
unsupported.”
Citing Teksavvy Solutions Inc v Bell Media Inc, 2020 FCA 108 at para 22). See also Paul Daly, “Waiting
for Godot: Canadian Administrative Law in 2019” (2020) 33 Can J Admin L & Prac 1 at 26-28.
71 Khela, supra note 8 at para 46, noting that per “Rule 4 of the Criminal Rules of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia, SI/97-140, a hearing of a habeas corpus application requires only six days’ notice.”
and that in the Federal Court, “if the parties take the full time allotted to them at each step of the
procedure, the request that a date be set for the hearing of the application will be filed 160 days after
the challenged decision.”
72 See Cristie Ford, Chapter 2.
66
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(2) the legislator has put in place complete, comprehensive and expert procedure
for review of an administrative decision.73
The first exception restricts challenges to a conviction or sentence to the ordinary
mechanisms of appeal. It also preserves bail decisions from habeas corpus except in
“extraordinary circumstances.”74 The second exception has been applied mainly in the
immigration context, but also parole75 and civil psychiatric detention (in Ontario,
specifically).76 It has recently been narrowed. As refined in Chhina, the question is now
whether there is an administrative process “at least as broad and advantageous as habeas
corpus regarding the specific challenges to the legality of the detention raised by the
habeas corpus application.”77 If the regime “fails entirely to include the grounds set out
in the application,” it is not “as broad or advantageous.”78 If the grounds are
contemplated by the administrative regime, the court must assess the relative
advantageousness of habeas corpus versus the administrative-regime-plus-judicialreview. Factors of relevance (from the case law since May) include placement of the onus
of proof, timeliness and responsiveness of remedy, and more.79
The analysis applied to the immigration detention regime in Chhina is instructive. The
grounds alleged in the habeas corpus application were lengthy and indeterminate
detention and illegal conditions in breach of ss 7 and 9 of the Charter.80 The majority
determined, first, that legality of conditions was not a consideration under the statutory
scheme, so habeas corpus brought on this ground could not be declined. In reaching this
conclusion, it refrained from interpreting the statute as a field of discretion wherein
decision-makers are presumed to take account of Charter values (the approach of Abella J
in dissent81). As to lengthy and indeterminate duration, while this was contemplated as a
Khela, supra note 8 at para 42, citing May, supra note 64 at para 50. Jared Will asks why these
common law exceptions to a Charter-protected right are permitted absent a s 1 analysis: J Will,
“Sidestepping the Charter, Again: Muting the Right to Habeas Corpus in Canada (Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina” (2021) 100 SCLR (2d) 143 at paras 24-32.
74 R v Pearson, [1992] 3 SCR 665, 1992 CanLII 52 [Pearson]; Khadr v Bowden Institution, 2015 ABQB
261, upheld in Bowden Institution v Khadr, 2015 ABCA 159.
75 John v National Parole Board, 2011 BCCA 188 at paras 32-42; R v Latham, 2009 SKCA 26 at paras
18-25; R v Graham, 2011 ONCA 138 at para 10-18; Ewanchuk v Canada (Parole Board), ABCA 2017
145 at paras 18-22. But see DG v Bowden Institution, 2016 ABCA 52 (following a negative decision of
the Parole Appeal Board, one can seek habeas corpus rather than judicial review in the Federal
Court).
76 Capano v CAMH, 2010 ONSC 1687 [Capano]; but see also Abbass v The Western Health Care
Corporation, 2017 NLCA 24 [Abbass] at paras 29-54.
77 Chhina, supra note 51, at para 6, emphasis added.
78 Chhina, ibid at paras 43, 37.
79 May, supra note 64 at paras 65-72. Chhina, supra note 51 at paras 54-68. The factors used in May to
guide analysis of whether the superior court had jurisdiction to deal with habeas corpus were: “(1)
the choice of remedies and forum; (2) the expertise of provincial superior courts; (3) the timeliness
of the remedy; (4) local access to the remedy; and (5) the nature of the remedy and the burden of
proof.” (May at para 65).
80 The foundation for the analysis of arbitrary detention under the regime is found in Chaudhary v
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 ONCA 700 [Chaudhary] at para 81.
81 Chhina, supra note 51. Abella J in dissent affirmed a Charter-informed reading of the authority and
responsibility of the Immigration Division to deal with indeterminate detention and other matters
73
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factor of relevance in the detention review regime, that regime was unlikely to deal with
this ground in a manner as advantageous as habeas corpus. This was due, inter alia, to
the speed and onus advantages of the great writ82 and evidence that the administrative
process was “susceptible to self-referential reasoning.”83 In short, the majority took a
hard look at the detention review regime in light of evidence of its functioning and saw
an impenetrable, Kafkaesque84 bureaucracy inured to the seriousness of indefinite and/or
otherwise illegal detention. Its answer was to open a habeas corpus escape hatch,
previously sealed to immigration detainees in deference to legislative intent and
administrative design.
Chhina has relevance to contexts beyond immigration. For instance, review of conditions
of confinement (including segregation or seclusion) is not among the powers accorded
administrative regimes of review of civil psychiatric detention.85 Habeas corpus should
be available to fill this gap. Another example involves parole. Prisoners have argued, so
far unsuccessfully, that the administrative regime for appealing revocation or denial of
parole is slow and unresponsive.86 Courts have been firm in refusing to create a judicial
mechanism of collateral attack on the statutory regime—although one appellate decision
held that habeas corpus is available following an internal appeal, to avoid the further
delays and complexity of seeking review in the Federal Court.87 The analysis in Chhina
might conceivably revive arguments about jurisdictional gaps or chronic delays—
reopening rifts between Dicey’s and, let us say, Abella J’s vision of the administrative
state and rule of law.
Back to the advantages of habeas corpus: the third, the onus on authorities to
demonstrate legality once certain threshold conditions are met,88 reflects the priority
assigned liberty and the prisoner’s constrained ability to access evidence and assemble
argument.89 Finally, the remedy—release—provides a straightforward through-line from
the applicant’s plight to the jailer’s obligation. Habeas corpus is in this way a close
touching fundamental rights—buttressed by ordinary processes of judicial review. See Paul Daly, “To
Have the Point: Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v Chhina, 2019 SCC 29.” (June 5,
2019, online: (blog) Administrative Law Matters
\<https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2019/06/05/to-have-the-point-canada-publicsafety-and-emergency-preparedness-v-chhina-2019-scc-29/\>
82 Chhina, supra note 51 at paras 66-67; but see Brown, supra note 70 at paras 118-35.
83 Chhina, supra, note 51, at para 62.
84 See Scotland v Canada (AG), 2017 ONSC 4850 [Scotland] at para 2.
85 Isabel Grant & Peter Carver, "PS v Ontario: Rethinking The Role of the Charter in Civil
Commitment"(2016) 53(3) Osgoode Hall LJ 999 at 1026-28.
86 For argument in support of habeas corpus jurisdiction in the parole context, see Adelina Iftene,
Punished for Aging: Vulnerability, Rights, and Access to Justice in Canadian Penitentiaries (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2019) at 209-13 [Punished]. Cases determining the parole regime
complete and comprehensive according to pre-Chhina case law include those cited at supra, note 75.
87 DG v Bowden Institution (Warden), 2016 ABCA 52. See also R v Bird, 2019 SCC 7 at paras 57-61
(noting, at para 59, “realistic concerns about the timeliness and accessibility of relief in the Federal
Court. When someone’s liberty is at stake, efficiency and timeliness take on greater significance.”)
88 See e.g. Khela, supra note 8 at para 30.
89 Judicial notice of these constraints is taken in Pratt v Nova Scotia (AG), 2020 NSCA 39 at paras 5657 [Pratt]
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cousin to mandamus (mandating action on the part of government), rarely ordered on
judicial review in keeping with principles of judicial restraint.90 The remedial capacities
of habeas corpus are further enhanced by its constitutionalization through s 10(c) of the
Charter, which lends it an integral connection to other Charter rights and to s 24(1)
remedies, a topic to which we return near the chapter’s end.
B. The Test
The test for habeas corpus is succinctly stated in Khela:
First, the applicant must establish that he or she has been deprived of liberty.
Once a deprivation of liberty is proven, the applicant must raise a legitimate
ground upon which to question its legality. If the applicant has raised such a
ground, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities to show that the deprivation
of liberty was lawful.91
A low threshold is to be applied in assessing whether the applicant has met the two parts
of the test for which they bear the onus.92 We address each element in turn.
1. Deprivation of Liberty
Deprivation of liberty has not been (and authorities concur, must not be) exhaustively
defined in habeas corpus law.93 The writ has been used in many contexts beyond prisons:
for instance, involuntary psychiatric hospitalization,94 detention in a secure facility under
the putative authority of adult protection95 or adult guardianship law,96 and deprivation of
legal capacity and related detention under “incompetent persons” law.97 Historically, the
writ was used to challenge the detention of fugitive slaves, opening a forum for
See Chhina, supra note 51 at para 65. But note the increased willingness to use mandamus in the
Federal Court in certain circumstances: D'Errico v Canada (AG), 2014 FCA 95 at paras 15-21.
91 Khela, supra note 8 at para 30, citing Farbey et al, supra note 42 at 84-85; May, supra note 64 at
paras 71, 74).
92 Toure v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2018 ONCA 681 [Toure] at
para 51; Wang v Canada, 2018 ONCA 798 [Wang] at para 25.
93 Gogan v Canada (AG), 2017 NSCA 4 (overturning an unreported decision of Hunt J) [Gogan NSCA]
at para 27.
94 Abbass, supra note 76. But see Capano, supra note 76. BC’s psychiatric detention law codifies the
right to habeas corpus: Mental Health Act, RSBC 1996, c 288, s 33 (2) and (3). On uses of habeas
corpus in the context of Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code see Janet Leiper, “Cracks in the Façade of
Liberty: The Resort to Habeas Corpus to Enforce Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code” (2009) 55 CLQ 134
and SE Fraser, "Hospital Knows Best: Court and Unfit Accused at the Mercy of Hospital
Administrators: The Case of R v Conception" (2015) 71 SCLR 301 at 319-22.
95 ZB v Provincial Director of Adults in Need of Protective Intervention, 2020 NLCA 17.
96 AH v Fraser Health Authority, 2019 BCSC 227 [AH v Fraser Health]. (Indigenous woman held in
secure settings and subject to restraints and coerced medication under “purported” authority of
Adult Guardianship law for nearly a year).
97 Habeas corpus was used to challenge Nova Scotia’s former Incompetent Persons Act, RSNS 1989, c
218 in proceedings eventuating in Webb v Webb, 2016 NSSC 180 (government conceded Charter
breach).
90
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disrupting the purported property rights of slaveowners.98 Facility-based detention is not
required.99 In England, the writ has been used to challenge conditions of release from
psychiatric hospital and in Canada, to review “virtual house arrest”100 imposed by
immigration officials. Neither is the writ necessarily confined to challenging public
action (despite that being its primary application today and our focus herein).
Historically, it was used to challenge restraint upon enslaved persons beyond prisonbased confinement,101 and in child custody and apprenticeship disputes.102 In recent times
it has been used in the United Kingdom to challenge restraint of “vulnerable adults” in
private dwellings,103 even in extra-territorial contexts.104
While scholars have argued for,105and courts have sometimes contemplated,106 an
enlarged conception of liberty within habeas corpus—for instance, reflecting the integral
interconnectedness of liberty with security of the person107 and/or equality108—the
doctrine continues to be anchored in spatial restriction. The Quebec Court of Appeal
recently firmly rejected a habeas corpus challenge to COVID-19 public health orders in
part because the applicant did not establish detention but rather grounded his claims in
fundamental freedoms including association, religion, conscience, and more.109
Barry Cahill, “Habeas Corpus and Slavery in Nova Scotia: R v Hecht Ex Parte Rachel, 1798” (1995) 44
UNBLJ 179.
99 Wang, supra note 92.
100 Wang, ibid at para 6.
101 Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499. And see Halliday, supra note 1 at 120-21.
102 See Farbey et al, supra note 42 at 188-92.
103 Re SA (Vulnerable Adult with Capacity: Marriage), [2005] EWHC 2942 (Fam), [2006] 1 FLR 867
cited in Farbey et al, supra note 42 at 189-90. At 183-95, the authors discuss “quantitative” as well as
“qualitative” forms of restraint that have in various jurisdictions been amenable to habeas corpus.
104 Re SK, [2004] EWHC 3202, [2006] 1 WLR 81 (Fam), discussed in Farbey et al, ibid at 190.
105 Linda Steele, “Troubling Law’s Indefinite Detention: Disability, the Carceral Body and Institutional
Injustice” (2021) 30:1 Soc & Leg Stud 80 at 81-82. Steele’s point is not precisely about habeas corpus
but rather indefinite detention (which is encompassed by habeas corpus). She examines practices of
detention and control proceeding from multiple sources of authority focused on the carceral body of
the Indigenous disabled woman in her case study. The example “exceeds conventional liberal legal
understandings of indefinite detention which are linked to the legal indeterminacy of one legally
ordered period of confinement in a legislated closed environment” and illustrates how “control of
Indigenous people’s lives and bodies is facilitated and legitimated not only through race but also
through the legal prisms of disability and health” (at 81-83). See also E Manning & MT
O’Shaughnessy, “AIDS Quarantine, Treatment as Prevention in British Columbia, and Possibilities for
Critical Clinical Social Work” in Catrina Brown & Judy E MacDonald, eds, Critical Clinical Social Work
Practice (Toronto: Canadian Scholars, 2020).
106 See the obiter comments in Brewer v Her Majesty the Queen, 2020 NSSC 308 [Brewer] at para 33.
107 Brewer, ibid. The requirement that the being suffering deprivation of liberty be a human has long
been considered not to require explicit mention. However, in recent years habeas corpus applications
have been brought in some countries (not yet in Canada) seeking to end the liberty deprivation of
members of other species—most commonly chimpanzees held in zoos or research facilities. While
there has been some success, notably in Argentina and Colombia, the conclusion of the New York
Court of Appeals that habeas corpus is available only for humans likely portends the result of any
similar Canadian venture: Nonhuman Rights Project v Lavery, 100 NE 3d 846 (NYCA 2018).
108 Debra Parkes, "Women in Prison: Liberty, Equality, and Thinking Outside the Bars" (2016) 12 JL &
Equality 127.
109 Racicot c Procureure générale du Québec, 2020 QCCA 656, affirming Racicot c Procureure générale
du Québec, 2020 QCCS 1322. See also Lévesque c Procureur général du Québec, 2021 QCCS 489.
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The primary doctrinal frame on point comes from Dumas v Leclerc Institute, where the
Supreme Court of Canada articulated three categories of liberty deprivation engaging
habeas corpus: the initial deprivation, a substantial change amounting to a further
deprivation, and a continuation of the deprivation (exceeding initial legality).110
a. Initial Deprivation (Category 1)
The first Dumas category is subject to the qualification that habeas corpus is unavailable
to challenge a criminal sentence; again, for that, one must appeal. In other contexts,
habeas corpus may be a permissible—and perhaps the only—means of attacking an
initial decision to detain. For instance, some civil psychiatric detention regimes fail to
contemplate release based on the illegality of the initial detention, focusing instead on
whether detention prerequisites are met at the time of a tribunal hearing weeks later.111
Habeas corpus may be available to challenge the initial detention in such situations.
b. Change Amounting to Further Deprivation (Category 2)
As noted, Miller expanded habeas corpus to include decisions affecting residual liberties.
It is clear that confining a prisoner to a special-purpose restrictive unit is a category 2
deprivation.112 So too is “transfer to a higher security institution.” 113 However, the
reduction in residual liberties must be “significant.”114 In some cases, complained-of
restrictions are deemed insubstantial: “trivial, intermittent, [or] transient”;115 affecting
mere privileges;116 normal aspects of prison life;117 or interference with interests that,
while significant, are unrelated to liberty.118 On the last point, courts struggle to
categorize claimed liberty deprivations (cuffs, restricted communications, an environment
saturated with threats and acts of violence) other than confinement to a specific
institutional space.119

[1986] 2 SCR 459, 1986 CanLII 38 at para 11 [Dumas].
See Abbass, supra note 76 at paras 40-48.
112 Khela, supra note 8 at para 34. Placement in a “Structured Intervention Unit” [SIU] (the regime
crafted in response to constitutional invalidation of “administrative segregation”—see CCRA, supra
note 46, ss 31-37) has been recognized as a further deprivation: Leslie v Edmonton Institution, 2020
ABQB 430 at paras 18-19 (however, no illegality there); Raju v Warden of Kent Institution, 2020 BCSC
894 (gov’t concession on this point).
113 Khela, ibid.
114 Miller, supra note 53 at para 35.
115 Hamm v Canada (AG), 2019 ABQB 247 [Hamm (2019)]; Cunningham v Canada, [1993] 2 SCR 143,
1993 CanLII 139 at 151; and see Ewanchuk v Canada (AG), 2017 ABQB 237 [Ewanchuk] at paras 3941.
116 Miller, supra note 53 at para 35.
117 Ewanchuk, supra note 115 at para 41 (reference is to a claim of 70 days of lockdowns; it is not
clear how long in cell per day; see paras 39-42, 66).
118 Again see Ewanchuk, ibid at para 45.
119 See Leslie v Edmonton Institution, 2020 ABQB 430 at para 25.
110
111
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Miller adds that the further deprivation should be “distinct and separate from that
imposed on the general inmate population.”120 Some courts have used this to refuse
habeas corpus on the basis that complained-of restrictions are not unique to the applicant
or a designated space—for instance, in the case of institution-wide “lockdowns.”121
Others reject that reasoning and hold that as long as an institution-wide increase in
restrictions has significant individualized effects, it should qualify. This was the
reasoning in a case recognizing COVID-19 measures that applied to all prisoners in a
federal facility as engaging habeas corpus jurisdiction.122 Yet depending on the
circumstances, it may be difficult to establish the baseline against which to assess
significant change/further deprivation, as neither correctional statutes nor common law
articulates the daily time out of cells the general population of prisoners may expect. As
noted below, an alternative approach would be to rely on Dumas category 3, initially
valid detention that becomes illegal: the category into which prolonged and indeterminate
detention fits.
Miller further describes Dumas category 2 deprivation as requiring “a new detention …
purporting to rest on its own foundation of legal authority.”123 This raises a question:
May a restrictive security classification assigned upon incarceration qualify as a
deprivation of liberty? This is particularly important for Black and Indigenous prisoners,
who are disproportionately likely to be classified maximum security and may wish to use
habeas corpus to challenge the legality of the assessment (for instance, as perpetuating
systemic discrimination).124 Some courts have concluded that the initial classification
cannot constitute a further deprivation as there is no previous, lower level of liberty
deprivation to compare it to—and because the authority on which the detention rests is
simply the (appealable) judicial sentence.125 The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal disagreed,
or at least held that this reasoning did not apply to the facts before it.126 It determined
that, since the reception unit in which the disputed security classification took place was
classed as partway between medium and maximum security, and the disputed
classification designated the prisoner as maximum (meaning he was said to require higher
security than the reception facility accommodated), the maximum classification and
transfer constituted a further deprivation. Whether, outside those circumstances, an initial
maximum security designation might be a deprivation of liberty is something the Court
did not decide. Courts are in clear agreement, however, that solitary confinement upon
incarceration (including at a reception unit) constitutes a further deprivation of liberty.127
An unresolved question is whether transfer from one facility to another with the same
security designation may amount to a “further” deprivation. A transfer might take one far
from family and disrupt program participation. Effects of dislocation on Indigenous
prisoners, and those with deep roots in local racialized/marginalized communities, may
Miller, supra note 53 at para 35.
Ogiamien v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 ONCA 667 at paras 88-89.
122 Cyr c Pilon, 2020 QCCS 1645 at paras 27-31 [Cyr].
123 Miller, supra note 53 at para 35.
124 See sources cited supra note 29.
125 LVR v Mountain Institution (Warden), 2016 BCCA 467 at paras 36-42.
126 Gogan NSCA, supra note 93.
127 Gogan NSCA, ibid and Wilcox v Alberta, 2020 ABCA 104 [Wilcox] at para 41.
120
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be particularly severe.128 While some cases recognize that lateral transfers may result in
deprivation of liberty,129 others reject this.130 Absent a formal elevation in institutional
security level, judges may be reluctant to recognize that a transfer intensifies isolation
through community dislocation, or that some facilities constrain residual liberties more
than others (given overcrowding, staff shortages, lockdowns—and/or, during the
pandemic, presence of COVID-19 in the surrounding community). Related problems may
affect one’s ability to establish liberty implications of transfers among provincial jails,
which tend to lack formal security classifications. However, courts may be willing to
look beyond labels. This was acknowledged of a transfer to a unit inside a Saskatchewan
facility not formally designated as more restrictive but which, on the facts, clearly was.131
Similarly, in Gogan v Nova Scotia, the Court adopted the applicants’ position that
“segregation is not a place”: while the two prisoners were not in a designated “close
confinement unit,” they were in conditions of solitary confinement.132
A last case of note is one the judge suggested satisfied Dumas category 2 while adding
that deprivation of liberty should not have to fit categorical boxes. In it, the judge
recognized as a further deprivation of liberty a trans woman’s experience of harassment
and vulnerability to sexualized violence in a men’s prison (following denial of her
request for transfer to a women’s prison), causing her to self-isolate in a mental health
unit.133 While self-isolation does not commonly engage deprivation of liberty,134 here it
was precipitated by a substantial change in conditions—the shift in the applicant’s
expressed gender identity and/or the consequent liberty-restrictive effects of a men’s
prison upon her.135
c. Continuing Deprivation (Which Has Become Illegal) (Category 3)
The obvious category 3 case would be detention beyond the term of sentence or after
parole has been granted.136 Speaking to the immigration detention context, Chhina

See Gray v Canada (AG), 2020 FC 1037 (not habeas corpus but related arguments used to obtain
interlocutory injunction re proposed transfer of Indigenous/Black Nova Scotian woman with close
community connections).
129 Bonamy v Correction Service Canada (Commissioner), 2000 SKQB 385 at paras 20-21 (transfer far
from friends and family intensifies isolation contrary to legislative purposes); R v Campbell, 2010
ONSC 6619 (freedom of movement more restricted despite same security level); R v Green, 2009
ABQB 233 (The question “is not to be determined on the basis of an analysis of labels” (at para 18);
however, “loss of ready access to family visits” (at para 33) does not qualify). See also Dodd v Isabel
McNeill House, 2008 ONCA 654; Ewert v Lalande, 2020 QCCA 1141.
130 Firbank v Canada (AG), 2016 ONSC 6592.
131 Mercredi v Saskatoon Provincial Correctional Centre, 2019 SKCA 86 at para 35 (more than double
the time locked in cell in the proposed unit).
132 Gogan v Nova Scotia (AG), 2015 NSSC 360 [Gogan 2015] at para 40.
133 Boulachanis c Thibodeau, 2020 QCCS 1020 [Boulachanis] at paras 90-105.
134 See e.g. Gagné c Directeur du pénitencier de Donnacona, 2021 QCCS 511 at para 53.
135 Boulachanis, supra note 133 at para 83. As noted below, illegality was not established.
136 Dumas, supra note 110, at para 12.
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indicates that this category also encompasses “extended detentions or detentions of
uncertain duration, which may engage ss 7 and 9 of the Charter.”137
An unsettled question is whether failure to transfer down (for example, from medium to
minimum security), or grant enhanced liberties such as temporary absences, may be
included within category 3. The argument for inclusion rests on the right to the least
restriction on liberty consistent with the sentence.138 If a prisoner requests a lower level
of security and the request is denied, why should habeas corpus not be accessible, the
way it is with an involuntary transfer “up”?139 There is case law on both sides.140 The
challenge is identifying when precisely deprivation of liberty is engaged. In part this is a
question of judicial economy (and once again, deference to the legislature’s institutional
designs). The answer may require the prisoner to make a prima facie case of entitlement.
Lisa Kerr gives an example: where a Case Management Team recommends acceptance of
a prisoner’s request for transfer down, but the warden denies it, Dumas category 3 is
arguably engaged.141 In the example, the Team’s recommendation is enough to raise a
reasonable doubt about whether detention at the current security level satisfies the least
restriction principle. In other cases, where there is nothing comparable to a
recommendation, it may be that making a prima facie case means “raising a reasonable
doubt about legality” (the next analytical step in the habeas corpus “test”).142
Beyond these examples are frontiers of liberty deprivation yet to be fully explored.
Dumas category 3 calls into question just what kinds of harsh conditions and treatment
should render continuing detention invalid in the sense of unhinging liberty deprivation
from its stated purpose—potentially even subverting the purpose or integrity of the
underlying criminal sentence. We return to this at the chapter’s end. The point for now is
that without cracking open habeas corpus to accommodate every kind of prisoner
complaint, there are matters beyond spatial restrictions that have strong claims to
impingement on prisoner liberty at this threshold stage. These include situations where
deprivation of liberty is fundamentally bound up with systematic inequality (on grounds
such as Indigeneity, race, disability, gender, and/or gender identity). For instance, where
a pregnant prisoner is prevented from accessing abortion or devising a birth plan,
obstruction of this choice is arguably a deprivation of liberty (both mobility and the right
to make choices of fundamental personal importance) magnified by gender inequality.
Where an Indigenous or a disabled prisoner experiences pressure to undergo sterilization,
or is deprived of contact with dependent children, the decisions of prison administration
impacting autonomy might be further connected to Canada’s long legacies of cultural
genocide and/or eugenics to strengthen the case for habeas corpus. Further, why should
habeas corpus be unavailable when prisoner complaints bleed into the life and security of
Chhina, supra note 51, at para 23. Illegality rests on whether detention is “no longer necessary to
further the machinery of immigration control” Chaudhary, supra note 80 at para 81.
138 CCRA, supra note 46, s 28. Lisa Kerr, “The Right to Maximum Prison Liberty?” (2016) 26 Crim
Reports 245.
139 Musitano v Canada (AG), 2006 CanLII 9151 at para 2, [2006] OJ No 1152 (QL) (Ont Sup Ct).
140 Cases in support are cited in R v Dorsey, 2020 ONSC 6297 at para 15; cases against, at para 16.
141 Kerr, “Maximum Liberty?” supra note 138 at 248.
142 See D’Arcy Leitch, "The Constitutionality of Classification: Indigenous Overrepresentation and
Security Policy in Canadian Federal Penitentiaries" (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 411 at 435-39.
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the person elements of s 7, bearing close enough relationship to liberty to reside in the
same formal rights-space? Why is the “great writ” not available to alert the courts to
extraordinary deprivations of food, warmth, or essential health care? Contemporary
conceptions of liberty recognize that freedom is impossible without an environment of
supports, starting with the necessities of life.
A recent Nova Scotia judgment shows a tentative willingness to contemplate such
frontiers.143 Those nervous at this prospect may draw on the Alberta Court of Appeal’s
caution that habeas corpus should not become “a legal Swiss Army knife” available for
any kind of prisoner grievance lest it lose its coherence and priority on the docket.144
2. Legitimate Ground
The second part of the habeas corpus test requires the prisoner to raise a legitimate
ground challenging the legality of the deprivation of liberty. Since Khela, these include
lack of jurisdiction,145 procedural unfairness and unreasonableness.146 Unconstitutionality
is clearly a legitimate ground.147 Again, a “low threshold”148 applies. The applicant need
only “raise an arguable issue”149 or show “there is a cause to doubt the legality of [their]
detention.”150 Khela confirms: “the matter must proceed to a hearing if the inmate shows
some basis for concluding that the detention is unlawful.”151
3. Legality (Onus on Authorities)
Legality is dealt with extensively in Chapters 6 and 9 by, respectively, Kate Glover
Berger and Laverne Jacobs (procedural fairness, independence and impartiality);
Chapters 11 and 12 by, respectively, Audrey Macklin and Paul Daly (substantive review);
and Chapters 7 and 15 by Evan Fox-Decent and Alexander Pless (Charter/administrative
law crossovers). What follows are select examples of analysis of legality in habeas
corpus cases and themes arising therein. Recall that in order to reach this point, the
prisoner has crossed the threshold of deprivation of liberty and raised a ground on which
to test the legality of the deprivation. The onus now shifts to the respondent.
What are the implications of this? Ordinarily, judicial review, whatever the standard of
review, places the onus on the applicant all the way through.152 The shift in onus in
Brewer, supra note 106 at para 33.
R v Latham, 2018 ABCA 308 at para 7.
145 Khela, supra note 8 at para 52 citing R v G (JP), 2000 CanLII 5673 (ONCA).
146 Ibid
147 Wilcox, supra note 127 at para 73.
148 Toure, supra note 92 at para 51.
149 Farbey et al, supra note 42 at 53.
150 May, supra note 64 at para 71. Per Toure, supra note 92, this is equivalent to raising a “reasonable
or probable ground” of illegality (para 51).
151 Khela, supra note 8 at para 41, citing May, supra note 64 at paras 33, 71.
152 There are live questions as to whether this is or should be the case in evaluating the
proportionality analysis mandated by Doré v Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12 [Doré], discussed in
Chapter 15.
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habeas corpus requiring authorities to justify detention on a balance of probabilities is
essential to the writ’s accessibility. Prisoners are absolved from assembling the evidence
and argument ordinarily required to succeed on review. Yet it is not always clear just how
the shift in onus interacts with a principle that has long anchored judicial review of prison
administration: deference. A question this raises is whether the specialness of habeas
corpus—the halo of its Magna Carta pedigree, its enshrinement in the Charter, its locus at
the sharp end of the state, its deployment by the most marginalized—gives rise to any
discernible difference in judicial conceptualizations or expressions of illegality. In this
specific sense, is there anything that special about habeas corpus? We pause to consider
this at a few points. However, the cases in this section are mostly illustrative of principles
covered elsewhere in this book. At the very least, they remind us of how deeply
evaluation of legality is inflected by context—here, the prison context.
To be clear, one should be cautious in seeking verification of the specialness of habeas
corpus on the face of judicial decisions (on legality or otherwise) alone. This may miss
implicit effects upon judicial dispositions flowing from the onus shift and more generally
the elevated status and urgency of the writ. Moreover, it may miss broader sociological
effects that the writ and its insistence on justification may have inside places of detention.
The presence of a stack of habeas corpus forms to be distributed by guards on request
(one of many arguable institutional obligations not invariably observed) and the everpresent prospect of being hauled off to court so that prisoners may cross-examine
wardens and guards may well inject a modicum of caution or fear of legal intervention
into these closed spaces that the remote prospect of lawyer-led judicial reviews (not only
infrequent but unlikely to require a response until long after a prisoner is released or
transferred) do not.
At the very least, we can assume that the effect of the onus in habeas corpus—as in
judicial review generally—is not simple. The onus necessarily interacts with the
imperative of context-sensitivity informing review of both procedural and substantive
legality. Here, a prominent theme in habeas corpus cases on both fairness and
reasonableness emerges: namely, deep tensions between deference to the expertise of and
discretion conferred on prison administration on the one side and responsiveness to
liberty deprivation on the other. Managing those tensions is at the heart of the analysis of
legality in habeas corpus. As with judicial review generally, there are signs that courts
are increasingly responsive to the significance of the interest and insistent on robust
justification. However, there are also instances in which judges appear to revert to the
idea that prisons are exceptional places where force and authority rule.
a. Procedural Fairness/Principles of Fundamental Justice
Prisoner habeas corpus cases frequently allege procedural unfairness. It is less common
than one might expect that s 7 of the Charter is argued as a throughway to fairness as a
principle of fundamental justice, raising a critical question—why? Why not (apart from
lack of legal representation) raise s 7 where liberty deprivation is in view? Of course, if
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what is challenged is a statutory provision circumscribing fairness in some respect, s 7 is
essential.153
As noted, one element distinguishing habeas corpus from conventional judicial review is
the onus on authorities to establish legality/fairness. At the same time, evaluation of
fairness is to reflect contextual considerations—specifically, those given non-exhaustive
expression in Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).154 It is not
invariably the case that habeas corpus judgments addressing unfairness reference the
Baker factors. Regardless, two (sometimes three) tend to inform analysis in a way that
cross-cuts specific process rights. These are “the significance of the interest at stake” and
“the choices of procedure made by the agency itself and its institutional constraints.”155
Typically, these are contradictory—the more significant the interest, the higher the
expectation of procedural protections; the more procedural discretion conferred on and
exercised by the decision-maker, the less inclined the court will be to interfere. Other
factors deemed to be reflective of legislative intent and institutional design may come
into play: for instance, the informal versus formal or inquisitorial versus adjudicative
nature of decision-making forums.
As to the weight accorded the interest at stake, in habeas corpus cases the applicant has
already established deprivation of liberty, associated with (not the same as establishing
breach of) at least three Charter rights beyond s 10(c). Regarding Baker factor five
(agency choices), judicial deference to prison administration continues to animate
prisoner rights cases in and beyond habeas corpus.156 This reflects the broad discretion
accorded to wardens and other prison authorities to set policies and make on-the-spot
decisions.157 It also arguably reflects something more: a residual attachment to a culture
of authority in certain islands or pockets of the administrative state, which also happen to
be the places where multiply subordinated legal subjects unwillingly reside.
i. Notice and the Right to Respond
The path of contemporary procedural fairness law in negotiating these tensions traces
back to Cardinal.158 Again, Cardinal arose from solitary confinement on the warden’s
instructions. A Segregation Review Board recommended release. The warden declined,
without sharing his reasons with the prisoners or giving them an opportunity to respond.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s granting of habeas corpus in Cardinal is important in
An example of statutory invalidation as a remedy framed as ancillary to habeas corpus is Way c
Commission des libérations conditionnelles du Canada, 2014 QCCS 4193 [Way SC] at para 2, aff’d
Canada (Procureur général) c Way, 2015 QCCA 1576, [Way CA], discussed below.
154 [1999] 2 SCR 817, 1999 CanLII 699 [Baker]. See Chapter 6.
155 Baker, ibid at paras 25 & 27.
156 A forthright statement of the deference judges have shown prison administration is in Re Howard
and Inmate Disciplinary Court, 1985 CanLII 3083, [1984] 2 FC 642 (CA) [Re Howard], MacGuigan J in
concurrence: “Order is both more necessary and more fragile [in prisons] than in even military and
police contexts, and its restoration, when disturbed, becomes a matter of frightening immediacy”
(para 79).
157 Ibid.
158 Supra note 53.
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and beyond prisons for three reasons: 1) it articulated the leading statement on the reach
of procedural fairness (encompassing administrative decisions “not of a legislative
nature” which affect “the rights, privileges or interests of an individual”);159 2) it stated
the minimal expectations of a fair hearing—notice and a right to respond;160 and 3) it
limited the judicial impulse to discount fairness-based illegality on grounds of deference.
The last point merits expansion. A unanimous Court opined that the fairness-based
expectations of notice and a right to respond were “fully compatible with the concern that
… prison administration, because of its special nature and exigencies, should not be
unduly burdened or obstructed by the imposition of unreasonable or inappropriate
procedural requirements.”161 The Court then articulated the strongest affirmation of the
value of fairness in the jurisprudence on point:
[T]he denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid,
whether or not it may appear to a reviewing court that the hearing would likely
have resulted in a different decision. The right to a fair hearing must be regarded
as an independent, unqualified right which finds its essential justification in the
sense of procedural justice which any person affected by an administrative
decision is entitled to have. It is not for a court to deny that right and sense of
justice on the basis of speculation as to what the result might have been had there
been a hearing.162
The statement is in some tension with the openness to remedial discretion recently
signaled in Vavilov,163 yet it returns us to first principles: fair process has inherent as well
as instrumental value, particularly in situations of profound power imbalance.
A contemporary habeas corpus case illustrates the writ flexing its constitutional muscles
to vindicate the right to a hearing. In Canada (AG) v Way the question was whether
legislation removing the prisoner’s right to an oral hearing following revocation of parole
breached s 7 of the Charter.164 The Quebec Superior Court positioned its analysis amidst
a line of Charter-based case law affirming the right to a hearing on parole
suspension/revocation. It observed that at post-suspension hearings issues of credibility
are central—a recognized basis for affording an oral hearing. In all of this, the key factor
was the importance of the interest affected.165 The Court added that the financial
considerations motivating the reforms were neither pressing and substantial nor did they
satisfy the other elements of s 1.166 It granted habeas corpus and ancillary remedies,

Ibid at para 14.
Ibid at para 21.
161 Ibid at para 22.
162 Ibid at para 23.
163 See Paul Daly, Chapter 12.
164 Way SC, supra note 153 aff’d Way CA , ibid.
165 Way SC, ibid at paras 67-73, 83-85
166 Ibid at paras 98-101; and see Way CA, ibid at para 78, citing Singh v Ministry of Employment and
Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177, 1985 CanLII 65 at 218-19.
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including invalidation of the offending provisions pursuant to s 52 of the Charter. The
Court of Appeal affirmed.167
ii. Disclosure
A second prominent procedural fairness concern is disclosure. The 2005 blockbuster
habeas corpus case May centred on whether Correctional Service of Canada [CSC]
officials had complied with disclosure obligations in circumstances of transfer to a higher
security facility. The five applicants had been transferred to medium-security prisons
following reassessment of those serving life sentences in minimum-security facilities.
The reassessments involved application of a computerized assessment tool (the Security
Reclassification Scale) which increased the security level of persons in the applicants’
position who had failed to complete a violent offender program. The Court held that
while the reclassification scheme was not as such illegal, CSC had failed to meet its
obligations under s 27(1) of the CCRA,168 which requires timely disclosure of “all the
information to be considered in the taking of the decision or a summary of that
information.” Specifically, CSC had withheld information on the “scoring matrix” or
algorithm on which the tool’s recommended classification was based. Lack of access to
this information, including the weight accorded factors of relevance, meant that the
prisoners were unable to fully test the case against them.
In Khela, the Supreme Court again dealt with statutory disclosure obligations under the
CCRA in circumstances of transfer. Beyond confirming the obligations stated in May,
Khela elaborated a process whereby authorities withholding information pursuant to s
27(3) of the CCRA (on bases such as security) must submit a sealed affidavit so that the
court may determine whether the decision to withhold is justified.169 Khela adds that
where this process is followed, officials will be granted deference as they are in the “best
position to determine whether such a risk could in fact materialize.”170
In Cyr c Pilon,171 the Quebec Superior Court determined that officials at a federal prison
failed to meet disclosure obligations under s 27(1) of the CCRA when imposing a
facility-wide COVID-19 lockdown protocol; however, the Court declined to issue habeas
corpus—taking inspiration from case law on the (slim) potential for s 1 justification of s
7 breach in emergencies.172 Turning to provincial-territorial correctional law, these
statutes often lack the specificity given procedural obligations in the CCRA. Yet judges
have drawn on federal law to inform fairness obligations, including disclosure. In
Lambert v Nova Scotia (AG),173 the prisoner’s habeas corpus application failed; however,
the judge cited Khela, along with an imperative to facilitate access to habeas corpus
Way CA, ibid.
Supra, note 46.
169 Khela, supra note 8 at paras 87-88. For an instructive application, see Richards v Springhill
Institution, 2014 NSSC 121 [Richards], appeal dismissed 2015 NSCA 40.
170 Khela supra note 8 at para 89.
171 Cyr, supra note 122.
172 Ibid at paras 35-37, citing Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, 1985 CanLII 81 [BC Motor
Vehicle] at 518.
173 2020 NSSC 282 [Lambert] at paras 45-51.
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through the superior courts’ inherent powers,174 to fashion a comparable regime for
reviewing information withheld from provincial prisoners.
iii. Counsel
The common law right to counsel has been confirmed in prison contexts, including in
habeas corpus cases, though it is not absolute and depends on the gravity of the liberty
deprivation and capacity of the prisoner to self-represent.175 There is as yet no recognition
of a right to state-funded counsel in matters of prison administration engaging liberty or
other fundamental rights. There is, however, precedent on which the argument may be
attempted. In New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G(J),176 the
Supreme Court affirmed a right to state-funded counsel for an impoverished claimant
facing removal of her children. This was grounded in security of the person and (for the
concurrence) also equality and liberty. G(J) articulates a contextual analysis for deciding
when legal aid is essential in child apprehension contexts. This and
Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v British Columbia (AG)177—which
reanimates s 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to support a (so far, narrow) right of access
to the superior courts—may provide a basis for challenging legal aid schemes that do not
adequately fund prison law matters.178
iv. Reasons
A right to reasons in cases of deprivation of liberty might seem like a no-brainer, yet,
particularly in provincial corrections where statutory duties are often thin, authorities
sometimes rely on policies or continuously cycling emergencies to supplant
individualized justification, particularly in written form. Recent judgments179 seek
support for this practice by quoting from Vavilov (in turn paraphrasing Baker) for the
point that “[i]n many cases … neither the duty of procedural fairness nor the statutory
scheme will require that formal reasons be given at all.”180 The question is how informal
reasons can be when deprivation of liberty is at issue. The decisions noted followed a
violent incident in a jail that, together with staffing and other institutional constraints
(including inability to transfer incompatible prisoners during COVID-19), was said to
justify holding the applicants in a “behavioural unit” featuring highly restricted periods
out of cell for upwards of 30 days at a time.181 For some of this period, the time in cell
Ibid at paras 50-51, citing Pratt, supra note 89 at para 90. See also Pratt, supra note 89 at paras 5458.
175 Re Howard, supra note 156 at paras 32-33. See also CCRA, supra note 46, s 97(2) & (3).
176 [1999] 3 SCR 46, 1999 CanLII 653 [G(J)].
177 2014 SCC 59 [BC Trial Lawyers Association].
178 For more on the s 96 angle, see Chapter 19 by Peter Carver.
179 Cox v Nova Scotia (AG), 2020 NSSC 81 [Cox 1]; Nagle-Cummings v Nova Scotia (AG), 2020 NSSC 188
at para 67 [Nagle-Cummings]; Crawley v Nova Scotia (AG), 2020 NSSC 221 at para 9.
180 Nagle-Cummings, ibid at para 62, citing Vavilov, supra note 67 at para 136; Cox 1, ibid at para 36
citing Vavilov, ibid at paras 136-137.
181 These and other prisoners were shifted among restrictive units through a series of distinct yet
related and compounded decisions. This recalls Jennifer Raso’s work on the fractured and fluid
realities of frontline decision-making in the social benefits context. See “Unity in the Eye of the
174

24

met the definition of solitary confinement. The judges concluded that written reasons
were not required and deduced the reasoning primarily from institutional records and
affidavits.182 The suggestion that reasons may be reconstructed in this manner and satisfy
procedural fairness, other than in rare cases of quasi-legislative rule-making or the
immediate aftermath of an emergency, sits uneasily with the centring of reasons in
Vavilov and in Baker where significant interests are at stake.183
v. Institutional Independence and Bias
It is important to note the potential for application of s 7 principles protecting against
institutional bias and lack of independence where liberty-restrictive decisions (including
but not limited to solitary confinement) are involved. This was a central basis of the
successes in the BC and Ontario litigation challenging federal “administrative
segregation”184 and a prior win against Alberta corrections that altered its disciplinary
regime thereafter.185 Provincial-territorial regimes beyond Alberta have yet to fall into
line on this point.186
b. Reasonableness
Vavilov has redirected judicial energies from formalistic mantras about administrative
expertise to whether decision-makers have been responsible and responsive in exercising
their authority. As noted, Khela confirmed that the reasonableness standard applies where
habeas corpus is used to challenge the substantive legality of liberty deprivation. This
was motivated, in part, by a concern for deference:
To apply any standard other than reasonableness in reviewing such a decision
could well lead to the micromanagement of prisons by the Courts. … Determining
whether an inmate poses a threat to the security of the penitentiary or of the
individuals who live and work in it requires intimate knowledge of that
penitentiary’s culture and of the behaviour of the individuals inside its
walls. Wardens and the Commissioner possess this knowledge, and related
practical experience, to a greater degree than a provincial superior court judge.187
However, Khela adds that
the traditional onuses associated with the writ will remain unchanged. Once the
inmate has demonstrated that there was a deprivation of liberty and casts doubt on

Beholder? Reasons for Decision in Theory and Practice in the Ontario Works Program” (2019) 70:1
UTLJ 1.
182 Nagle-Cummings, supra note 179 at paras 32-44.
183 See Chapter 6 by Kate Glover Berger and Chapter 12 by Paul Daly.
184 Supra notes 33 and 34.
185 Currie v Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2006 ABQB 858.
186 But see, e.g., recent revisions to Yukon’s Corrections Act, 2009, SY 2009, c 3, ss 19.08, 26-27.
187 Khela, supra note 8 at paras 75-76.
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the reasonableness of the deprivation, the onus shifts to the respondent authorities
to prove that the transfer was reasonable in light of all the circumstances.188
Any tensions between deference and the shift in onus have not been noted or explored in
habeas corpus cases applying reasonableness review. Yet perhaps those tensions are not
so great with the refreshed orientation to demonstrated expertise in Vavilov. Below we
consider examples of how Vavilov’s robust reasonableness standard may inform (and is
already informing) habeas corpus in prison contexts. These suggest that the new ethos of
justification—in particular, Vavilov’s guidance on legal and factual constraints on
reasonable administration—has potential to breathe life into prisoner litigation while
modulating the troubling legacy of judicial deference to prison authority.
i. Internal Incoherence
In habeas corpus cases, as in all instances of judicial review, the analysis of
reasonableness is to be anchored in attention to the decision-maker’s reasoning. The
judge is to have an open mind, attentive to the possibility that the decision-maker has
sector-specific insights or institutional know-how the judge lacks. However, deference
does not mean submissiveness, and the judge does not purport to be a know-nothing—
particularly where fundamental rights are involved. It is counsel’s job to accentuate the
positive or negative in the administrator’s reasons, guided by Vavilov’s roadmap.
The first of two flaws that may vitiate a decision on reasonableness review is internal
incoherence: “a failure of rationality internal to the reasoning process.”189 It may
sometimes be a toss-up as to whether a decision is better classed as lacking a reasonable
basis in law or evidence (the second kind of fundamental flaw) or incoherent on its
face—particularly where the problem is gaps in reasoning. In any case, this ground may
assist in calling out the “exercise of public power without a cogent case to support such
power” in prison contexts.190
A pre-Vavilov habeas corpus example straddling incoherence and insufficient evidence
was Nguyen v Mission Institution (Warden).191 Nguyen was subject to an involuntary
transfer based on his alleged role in institutional gang activity and drug dealing. The
primary evidence, information on a phone found on another prisoner, was deemed by the
judge to be unreasonably flimsy. Yet “the institution continued to swaddle a small
amount of evidence in clouds of justification, much of which, paradoxically, repeated
what had been acknowledged to be unreliable.”192 Among the proffered supports were
opinions that Nguyen’s good behaviour was simply a ruse (“impression management”)
cultivated “while secretly holding a pro-criminal value system.”193 The judge concluded
that it was
Ibid at para 77.
Vavilov, supra note 67, at para 101.
190 Ian Davis, “Taking Prisoners’ Rights Seriously on Substantive Habeas Corpus Review” (2019)
8:1 Can J Hum Rts 29.
191 2012 BCSC 103.
192 Ibid at para 63.
193 Ibid at paras 61, 59.
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not possible on the record before the court to discern a reliable path to the
conclusions drawn by the institution, given the institution’s manifest failure to
discriminate between the evidence it had and the hypothetical consequences it
attributed to the applicant throughout.194
ii. Lack of Justification
The second fundamental flaw from Vavilov is lack of justification in light of legal and
factual constraints. We begin with cases focused on the facts.
Failure to Justify in Light of the Evidence
Vavilov affirms that administrative decisions must be justified in light of the evidence.
Many habeas corpus cases since Khela concentrate on this; indeed it was the sole
example of unreasonableness offered in that judgment: liberty deprivation “absent any
evidence or on the basis of unreliable or irrelevant evidence, or evidence that cannot
support the conclusion.”195 Khela adds that while deference will be shown to
determinations “that evidence is reliable … authorities will nonetheless have to explain
that determination.”196
A pre-Vavilov example where habeas corpus was granted based on unreasonable
misapprehension of evidence is Hennessy v Warden of Kent Institution.197 The prisoner
was transferred to a higher security facility on allegations of assaulting another prisoner.
The evidence centred on video of the applicant entering the victim’s cell. However, the
applicant pointed out that the video also showed him leaving the cell with the other
individual a few seconds after, something unexplained in the institutional account. The
judge noted that if “such apparently significant evidence is to be given no weight, some
explanation is required.”198 As Ian Davis points out, this case and other post-Dunsmuir
prisoner rights cases illustrate a further important feature of reasonableness review: the
expectation that decision-makers be responsive to parties’ submissions, including
prisoners’ rejoinders on key facts.199
There are numerous other examples of unreasonably thin or misapprehended evidence
cases, some of which also illustrate the responsiveness principle. In Hamm v Attorney
General of Canada (Edmonton Institution),200 the judge determined that there was no
reasonable basis in the evidence to hold the applicants in solitary—a ruling that also
implicitly engaged proportionality, as the judge further accepted that even if the facts
alleged had been established, less restrictive responses were available.201 A further case
Ibid at para 63.
Khela at, supra note 8 at para 74.
196 Ibid.
197 2015 BCSC 900.
198 Ibid at para 18.
199 See Davis, supra note 190 at 55-64. See also Vavilov, supra note 67 at paras 127-28.
200 2016 ABQB 440 [Hamm 2016].
201 Ibid at para 10.
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arguably qualifying both as lacking a reasonable foundation in evidence and lacking
proportionality, as it turned on the weight accorded a small infraction, is Antinello v
Warden of Dorchester Institution.202 There the prisoner succeeded in challenging
involuntary transfer to a higher security institution based on failure to return a gospel
music device on time. Of course, many cases go the other way. In a recent decision, the
prisoner’s habeas corpus challenge to transfer on the argument that the evidence was
weak was denied with a reminder that the standard required of authorities is not proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.203
Decisions on reasonableness of factual foundations or responsiveness to prisoner
submissions are trickier where the rationale for liberty restriction is not individual
wrongdoing but rather institutional constraints—for instance, staff shortages,
overcrowding, or COVID-19. In one case, a prisoner challenged his placement on a
COVID-19 quarantine unit following an escorted temporary absence, arguing, inter alia,
that conditions were unduly restrictive and that his absence to attend his daughter’s
funeral had been comparable to accompanied court or medical visits not requiring
quarantine.204 The application failed. The judge declined to second-guess the evidentiary
supports for the quarantine protocols designed in consultation with public health.205 In
another case a prisoner brought habeas corpus to challenge four months in an intensive
security unit because of a breakdown of control systems in the unit to which he was
initially assigned.206 That initial unit (the SIU) had entitled him to four hours out of cell
daily while the new one afforded far less (the applicant argued just one hour) and lacked
a common area.207 The prisoner challenged the rationale for the move—alleging staff
sabotage, which the judge rejected—and argued that the restrictive transfer was made
without justification including disclosure of supporting information and a right to
respond.208 The application was dismissed for failing even to raise a reasonable doubt
about legality, including reasonableness, on the facts or law. The institution had statutory
authority to suspend SIU entitlements in emergencies, full stop.209 The court added that
the restrictions had since been eased and, to the extent the applicant was self-isolating for
his own protection, he was the “architect of his own misfortune.”210
These judgments, and others,211 show deference to administration on the reasonableness
of unit- or institution-wide measures that administration claims are necessary for
2018 NBQB 9.
Rivest v Gardien du Pénitencier de Dorchester, 2020 NBQB 12.
204 Cox v Nova Scotia (AG), 2020 NSSC 253 [Cox 2].
205 Cox 2, ibid at paras 30-32, 45-46. See also Cyr, supra note 171 at paras 45-46 (pandemic threat and
duty to protect health and safety made quarantine protocol which applicant argued to be 23 hours incell per day the only reasonable decision in the circumstances.)
206 Lévesque-Gervais v Directeur du pénitencier de Donnacona, 2021 QCCS 239 [Lévesque-Gervais].
207 A decision-maker under the SIU regime concluded that administrations’ statutory obligations to
enable the applicant to leave his cell and access social interaction had not been met (at paras 12-13).
208 Ibid at paras 18-21. The right to a hearing is not addressed in the judgment.
209 Ibid at paras 51-53.
210 Ibid at para 56.
211 See also Cox 1, supra note 179 (Four prisoners in “rotational lockdown” unit following violent
incident “endured days of restricted time including up to 23 hours per day due to safety and security
concerns.” (para 78). Evidence in support plus plan to increase out-of-cell time = reasonable.)
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institutional safety and security. Each case raises different circumstances. Yet a common
theme (with rare exceptions) is absence of judicial probing or express consideration of
whether less-impairing alternatives were available (something we return to with
proportionality, below).
A recent decision on unreasonableness cuts through factual claims about intractable
institutional constraints and recentres the seriousness of liberty deprivation. In Downey
and Gray v AG (Nova Scotia),212 the applicants were two young Black Nova Scotian men
remanded to jail pre-trial. They used habeas corpus to challenge confinement in a Health
Segregation Unit, barely distinguishable from disciplinary segregation cells. There they
were allowed out of cells for 1-2.5 hours per day. They had been under these or similar
restrictions (sometimes disciplinary, sometimes safety based) for 201 and 267 days
respectively.213 The judge recounted the institution’s position: “In essence, the
Respondents argue that the present placement is reasonable because there are no other
available options. In other words, it is the best it can do in the circumstances.”214
An important feature of the judgment is its recognition of a sustained pattern of solitary
confinement where the evidence might otherwise have yielded a set of disjointed
placements and as many rationales. Further, on the institution’s position that it was the
applicants’ incompatibility with or vulnerability to others that was the problem—a matter
of hard facts, not the institution’s decisions—the judge stated:
It is too easy to suggest that the Applicants have created this situation and, as
such, have no standing to complain. In other words, they are responsible for their
own misfortune. This is a misguided theory and this Court must guarantee that
penal institutions do not adopt such an attitude.215
The deciding factor for the judge was the length and indefinite duration of segregation.
Evidence of lack of institutional options together with anticipated COVID-19 delays to
upcoming court dates did not excuse the indefinite pre-trial detention, but rather unhinged
it from lawful (reasonable) authority. In stating this conclusion, Coady J indicated that he
was “affording [the institution] considerable deference.” While the judge did not cite
specific Charter rights (reflecting the sparseness of the applications),216 he quoted a
scholar217 for the point that Charter values are integral to reasonableness, later observing
that segregating the applicants “indefinitely offends the principles of habeas corpus and
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.”218
Constraining Discretion With Law

2020 NSSC 213 [Downey and Gray].
Ibid at paras 1 & 6.
214 Ibid at para 6.
215 Ibid at para 10.
216 The grounds stated in the prisoners’ applications are reproduced as submitted, ibid at paras 2 & 3.
217 Ibid at para 12, quoting Tim Quigley, College of Law, University of Saskatchewan.
218 Ibid at para 21. The unconventional remedy assigned is discussed in Part IV.C, below.
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Following the trend of reasonableness review in habeas corpus law since Khela, we
started with cases impugning decisions as unreasonably unhinged from the facts. The last
case noted (Downey and Gray) showed a court piercing alleged factual intractability to
reveal a decision unhinged from lawful authority.
Vavilov suggests that analysis of justification should begin with the governing statutory
scheme.219 Correctional law tends to confer ample discretion to restrict liberty on the
basis of order or security. The question for the detainee is how to constrain that
discretion. Apart from norms of statutory interpretation, Vavilov reminds us of legal
sources beyond the governing statute that may act as constraints, such as human rights
statutes, common law precedents, and international law.
Vavilov does not include the Charter among the “legal and factual constraints” it recites
as pertinent to justification. It expressly declines to discuss the Doré model of
unreasonable decision-making based in failure to proportionately balance statutory
mandates and Charter rights,220 yet beyond this, it does not give even passing mention to
the conventions around using the Charter to inform statutory interpretation.221 While
habeas corpus cases rarely address statutory interpretation—likely reflecting the realities
of self-representation plus the pervasiveness of fact-intensive discretion in prison
administration—it is worth recalling the imperative of grounding interpretation in the
rights and values recognized in Canada as supreme law.222
Perhaps Vavilov’s central contribution to review of legality in prison contexts is its
acknowledgement that, even when not statutorily implemented, “international treaties and
conventions … can help to inform whether a decision was a reasonable exercise of
administrative power.”223 Many international norms of importance to prisoners are
located in soft law—not treaties, but standards often reflecting the participation of
multiple nations.224 The Mandela Rules,225 recognized by Canadian courts to
authoritatively define solitary confinement and to inform Charter standards on point,226
are an example. Even before recent public interest litigation resulting in constitutional
invalidation of the federal regime of administrative segregation, those rules (and other
international legal norms) assisted in habeas corpus cases arguing the
unreasonableness227 and/or Charter non-compliance228 of prolonged solitary.
Vavilov, supra note 67 at paras 108-110.
Doré, supra note 152; Vavilov, ibid at para 57.
221 Like Doré proportionality, the role of the Charter in statutory interpretation is contentious and
reasonableness review adds a further (deferential) twist. See John Mark Keyes & Carol Diamond,
“Constitutional Inconsistency in Legislation—Interpretation and the Ambiguous Role of Ambiguity”
(2017) 48:2 Ottawa LR 315.
222 Ibid at 319, 324-25.
223 Vavilov, supra note 67 at para 114. This was of course already confirmed in Baker, supra note 154.
224 On the crafting of the Mandela Rules, see Jennifer Peirce, “Making the Mandela Rules: Evidence,
Expertise, and Politics in the Development of Soft Law International Prison Standards” (2018) 43:2
Queen's LJ 263.
225 Supra note 32.
226 CCLA CA, supra note 33 at paras 28-29; BCCLA CA, supra note 34 at para 168. See also Brazeau v
Canada (AG), 2020 ONCA 184 at paras 71, 82.
227 Hamm 2016, supra note 200 at paras 10, 91–95.
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Other Mandela Rules may assist in establishing that a once-legal detention has become
illegal. These include rules against double-bunking, rules on access to health care and the
role of health care staff, and more. The Bangkok Rules229 establish minimum standards of
women’s incarceration. They mandate gender-specific health care, alternatives to strip
searches and invasive body searches, a rule against using restraints on women during
labour and birth, and rules around accommodation of relationships with children. On the
latter point, the best interests of the child are regularly subordinated to other
considerations in criminal justice sentencing.230 This is a point that demands revisiting;231
at any rate, however, the principle should, in accordance with Baker, receive serious
weight in administrative decisions restricting prisoners’ liberties in ways that affect their
relationships with their children, including involuntary transfers, parole, and subjection to
intensive in-cell time affecting access to telephones or visits.
Where Indigenous persons and the integrity of their families and communities are
affected by decisions involving deprivation of liberty, The UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples232 may assist in recentring those decisions in light of state-to-state
obligations and Indigenous-led alternatives to incarceration.233 It is already clear that
Gladue principles and the mandate of reconciliation must be central to analysis of legality
in decisions touching upon Indigenous incarceration. Twins v Canada (AG) 234
established the unreasonableness of a decision to revoke Joey Twins’s235 parole on the
basis that the tribunal failed to properly apply Gladue principles. While not a habeas
corpus case, Twins illustrates use of Gladue to spur decision-makers to take
responsibility for redressing the dislocation and systemic discrimination that have
produced high Indigenous incarceration rates, and to promote alternatives.

Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden), 2010 BCSC 805 [Bacon] at paras 272-90
(drawing on the precedent document to the Mandela Rules along with other international norms).
229 United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for
Women Offenders (The Bangkok Rules), GA Res 65/229, UNGAOR, 65th Sess, Supp No. 49, UN Doc
A/RES/65/229 (2010) [Bangkok Rules].
230 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (AG), 2004 SCC 4 at para 10.
231 See, e.g. Hayli Millar & Yvon Dandurand, “The Best Interests of the Child and the Sentencing of
Offenders with Parental Responsibilities” (2018) 29 Crim LF 227.
232 GA Res 61/295, UNGAOR, 2007, art 21.1 [UNDRIP]; Yvonne Boyer et al, “First Nations, Métis, and
Inuit Prisoners’ Rights to Health within the Prison System: Missed Opportunities” (2019) 13:1 McGill
JL & Health 27 at 56-7.
233 See CCRA, ss 81 & 84, and discussion in the Senate Interim Report, supra note 29 at 54-56. On
potential use of habeas corpus to challenge security classification and attendant refusal of an
application for release to a Healing Lodge or Indigenous community, see Leitch, supra note 142.
234 Twins v Canada (AG), [2017] 1 FCR 79, 2016 FC 537 [Twins]. See R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688,
1999 CanLII 679. And see
Germa c Tremblay, 2019 QCCS 1764 at paras 87-99 (transfer upheld despite challenge on Gladue
prin- ciples), appeal dismissed on other grounds in Snooks c Procureur général du Canada, 2020
QCCA 586.
235 Office of the Correctional Investigator, Press Release, “Ms Joey Twins Receives the 2020 Ed
McIsaac Human Rights in Corrections Award (10 December 2020), online: \<https://www.ocibec.gc.ca/cnt/comm/press/press20201210eng.aspx#:~:text=Joey%20Twins%20is%20the%202020,Zinger\>
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Because habeas corpus offers an opportunity to raise international law to challenge the
reasonableness/legality of detention, it is essential that counsel be apprised of (even
creative with) these resources. Yet it is also important that relevant international
standards be available to prisoners, who are often unassisted when they make their
applications. In recent consultations on reproductive justice convened by the Elizabeth
Fry Societies in federal women’s prisons, prisoners showed interest in learning more
about international human rights,236 particularly UNDRIP. Accessible guides to the
Mandela Rules, Bangkok Rules, UNDRIP, and other international standards—as well as
the Charter—should be available to prisoners and reviewed by staff on a mandatory
basis.237 This marks a concrete opportunity to facilitate the democratic rule of law ideal
of “constituting fundamental values”238 at the point of law’s administration—although
one anticipates that growing awareness of the standards in question will more likely
further destabilize than legitimize prison administration.
Seriousness of Impact
The Vavilov majority writes that
if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the
decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s
intention. This includes decisions with consequences that threaten an individual’s
life, liberty, dignity or livelihood.239
In habeas corpus, deprivation of liberty is in play, and so the consequences are almost
certainly harsh. But it is uncommon for judges to oversee the reasoning of prison
administrators in the way described—that is, requiring acknowledgement of the
seriousness of effects and explanations of why those are necessary according to law.
Prison lawyers should argue per Vavilov that administration must take account of effects
on individuals in a substantive and not merely pro forma way.
The required attention to impact may be further elaborated to urge responsiveness to
structural injustice expressed through individualized decisions, including consequences
of liberty deprivation extending over time across disproportionately affected
communities. This was the approach taken in the pre-Vavilov case noted above, Twins,
which required more of the tribunal than a box-ticking of Gladue considerations. A postVavilov example is Downey v Nova Scotia (AG).240 While neither a habeas corpus nor a
Martha J Paynter, Reproductive (In)justice in Canadian Federal Prisons for Women (Canadian
Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, 2021).
237 See ibid, Recommendation 7 at page 44. An excellent example of a resource designed to assist
prisoners with DIY applications is Hanna Garson’s Habeas Corpus in Nova Scotia: An Accessible Guide
(Halifax: East Coast Prison Justice & Elizabeth Fry Societies Mainland NS & Cape Breton, 2017). This
and other user-friendly resources, online: \<https://efrymns.ca/home/resources/\>.
238 David Dyzenhaus, “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in Administrative Law”
(2002) 27 Queen’s LJ 445 at e.g. 501-02.
239 Vavilov, supra note 67 at para 133.
240 2020 NSSC 201. To be clear, not the same as Downey & Gray, discussed earlier. See also Paul Daly’s
discussion of the case in Chapter 12.
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prison case, in Downey the judge appealed to Vavilov on the requisite responsiveness to
impact and then expressly linked the harm done to the individual property interests of the
applicant (an African Nova Scotian man denied access to a land title remediation regime)
to the wider harms of anti-Black racism restricting African Nova Scotians’ access to land
title over hundreds of years.241 Anti-Black racism is also at the root of disproportionate
policing and incarceration.242 As illustrated in Twins, acknowledging systematic racial
oppression by and through the administrative state is essential to the reparative work
required of both courts and administrative agencies in prison law cases and is essential to
attaining the true measure of impact.243
Doré Proportionality
As noted, Vavilov does not touch Doré proportionality. Therefore, the controversial
doctrine for dealing with Charter challenges to administrative decisions (discretion
exercised under an imprecise grant of authority244) remains. Doré asks whether “the
decision interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee no more than is necessary given
the statutory objectives.”245 A margin of appreciation (deference) is applied—similar, we
are told, to what occurs under s 1 of the Charter. However, unlike conventional Charter
analysis where the onus is on the applicant to establish breach and then on government to
justify, Doré places the onus on applicants to show both engagement/breach of the right
and lack of proportionality.246
Much ink has been spilled on whether Doré marks an indefensible dilution of Charter
rights, the inception of a People’s Charter, or old wine in new bottles. But there is
nothing on its place in habeas corpus—including whether it is even possible to integrate
Doré with the doctrinal peculiarities of the great writ. Since Khela integrates
reasonableness review into habeas corpus, one would expect Doré to be part of the
package. However, there are as yet no reported habeas corpus cases in which Doré is
applied. It is an uneasy fit. Doré, as noted, places the burden on applicants to show both
breach and disproportionality, while with habeas corpus the burden of justification for
liberty deprivation lies with the depriver. Moreover, while Oakes and Doré are said to
work the same “justificatory muscles,” the comparison loses cogency where s 7 (inclusive
Ibid at paras 37-38, referencing the further historical and contextual analysis in the decision of
Bodurtha J in Beals v Nova Scotia (AG), 2020 NSSC 60. See also African Nova Scotian Affairs, “Land
Titles Initiative” at https://ansa.novascotia.ca/landtitles.
242 Scot Wortley, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Street Checks Report (NS Human Rights Commission, 2019);
Francis Campbell, “Nova Scotia 'doubling down' on justice system disparities, says DPAD coalition
member,” Chronicle Herald (2 March 2021), online:
\<https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/provincial/nova-scotia-doubling-down-on-justicesystem-disparities-says-dpad-coalition-member-558832\>.
243 See Maria C Dugas, “Committing to Justice: The Case for Impact of Race and Culture Assessments
in Sentencing African Canadian Offenders,” (2020) 43:1 Dal LJ 103 at 153-54 (on the duty to take
anti-Black systemic discrimination and structural injustice into account in and beyond sentencing
contexts in a manner comparable to the expansion of Gladue considerations).
244 Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, 1989 CanLII 92.
245 Doré, supra note 152 at para 7.
246 In Law Society of British Columbia v Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32, McLachlin and Rowe
JJ write concurring opinions suggesting that the onus shift can and does occur within the Doré frame.
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of principles of fundamental justice) is breached.247 In such cases, Charter case law tells
us that space for s 1 justification shrinks—and tolerance for “administrative expediency”
is at an all-time low.248 In short, there seems to be little room for “balancing” a s 7 breach
in or beyond habeas corpus law.
To be clear, habeas corpus cases can and do—and arguably, more often should249—
centre on Charter breach. Chhina confirms that the constitutionalized writ is integrally
interconnected with ss 7 (liberty), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 12 (cruel and unusual
treatment), and there are examples of successes on each of these grounds.250 Yet s 1 is
seldom applied as a means of justifying liberty deprivation (of note, the vast majority of
these cases challenge decisions versus laws).251 That said, proportionality assessment is
often discernible in habeas corpus judgments whether or not Charter rights are expressly
engaged. For instance, in Gogan (2015), decided on reasonableness review with no
distinct Charter analysis, the reasons authorities offered for segregation did not meet
expectations of justification because they “depreciate[d] the severity of solitary
confinement and the gravity of the prisoner’s constitutionally protected interest in
residual liberty.”252 One rationale in particular, overcrowding, drew from the judge a
statement expressive of proportionality analysis together with a rejection of
administrative expediency as justification:
It is unreasonable to make prisoners pay for overcrowding, whether it results from
fiscal restraint or minimum sentences or both, by making them submit to the
agony of solitary confinement. All prisoners are forced to pay for the
government’s choice of overcrowding by being housed in overcrowded jails and
prisons. To compound that with solitary confinement when on remand is
unreasonable because it is so unfair.253
A similar caution against reliance on expediency in a context of prolonged solitary
confinement is found in Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre, where breach of ss 7
and 12 of the Charter was confirmed (s 1 was not applied).254 Anticipating the judgment
noted above, Downey and Gray,255 (as much a proportionality case as one piercing the
factual claim that solitary was the applicants’ only option), the judge in Bacon states that
the position of correctional authorities
seems to be that keeping [the applicant] “safe” requires an either/or choice
between physical safety and psychological integrity. If that is true because
Doré, supra note 152 at para 5. I thank Paul Quick and John Conroy for discussion on this point.
BC Motor Vehicle, supra note 172 at para 85; Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at paras 124-29.
249 See Iftene, Punished, supra note 86 at 201-13.
250 Chhina, supra note 51 at para 21. And see e.g. Trang v Alberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2010
ABQB 6.
251 Section 1 is applied in Way SC, supra note 153, which resulted in a declaration of constitutional
invalidity.
252 Gogan 2015, supra note 132 at para 30.
253 Ibid at para 32.
254 Bacon, supra note 228. .
255 Supra note 212.
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resources are lacking, it simply means that the government has to do better.
Discretion over expenditures stops where treatment falls below a constitutional
minimum.256
Other habeas corpus cases, in other circumstances, conclude that liberty deprivation is
Charter compliant because reasonable/proportional in light of statutory objectives. In
Boulachanis, noted above, a trans woman was denied transfer to a prison for women on
the basis that her escape risk/security level was too high.257 She alleged breach of ss 7
and 12, citing serious harms including self-isolation arising from her confinement in a
men’s prison where she “constantly feels on the verge of being raped, whether by fellow
inmates or by certain guards.”258 The court acknowledged the suffering of the applicant
but concluded that denial of transfer was reasonable and Charter compliant as authorities
had accommodated her as far as possible in light of her security classification.259 In this
and other cases, proportionality is always already weighted with seemingly impenetrable
institutional risk and security assessments.
With the renewed focus in Vavilov on constraints on discretion, it would be surprising not
to see a new focus on Charter illegality in habeas corpus cases. This may include use of s
15 to challenge liberty deprivation as exacerbating pre-existing disadvantage on grounds
of Indigeneity, race, gender, gender identity, disability, or other grounds260—whether in
contexts of involuntary transfer, solitary confinement, or less-conventional situations in
which valid detention becomes invalid, as contemplated in Boulachanis. Yet while it
appears judges already factor proportionality into analysis of legality in habeas corpus
cases, it is not clear that there is space in the great writ for public interest-style
justification “saving” detention shown to breach ss 7, 9 or 12, or for that matter s 15 —let
alone the reversal of onus contemplated by Doré.
C. Remedies and Rule of Law Redux
Among the advantages of habeas corpus already mentioned is its swift and powerful
remedy: release from illegal detention. Authorities are not permitted to re-detain on
authority of the original order.261 However, depending on the circumstances, renewed
detention on other grounds is possible—as in Khela, where, by the time the case hit the
Bacon, supra note 228 at para 318.
Boulachanis, supra note 133. See also the precedent decision of Grammond J granting an
interlocutory injunction based in a prima facie case of discrimination: Boulachanis v Canada (AG),
2019 FC 456; stayed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Attorney General of Canada v Boulachanis,
2019 FCA 100 (noted in Boulachanis, supra note 133 at para 14).
258 Ibid at para 39 [translated by author using Google translate].
259 Ibid at paras 136-54.
260 See sources cited at note 29, supra, & Leitch, supra note 142. And see Tom Cardoso, “Proposed
Class-Action Suit Against Ottawa Suggests Inmates Face Systemic Bias in Risk Assessments,” Globe
and Mail (12 January 2021) /<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-proposed-classaction-suit-against-ottawa-suggests-inmates-face/>.
261 Ogiamien v Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), 2017 ONCA 839 [Ogiamien 2] at
para 44, Sharpe J, citing Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Kwok-a-Sing (1873), LR 5 PC 179, at 202
(PC).
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Supreme Court of Canada, the applicant had long since been returned to the maximumsecurity prison he had been released from on the habeas corpus application in issue.262
This raises the question again: how great is the great writ? The answer requires attention
to consequences—not only the immediate effects for individual prisoners but also
systemic effects that habeas corpus may have on prison administration and the court
system. On this point, Ian Davis argues that Khela’s injecting reasonableness review into
habeas corpus has produced a tool more fit for purpose than ever—seeding the rule of
law in dark places. He writes:
[E]ffective corrections need not be based on a fundamental imbalance of power.
Rather, the key to acquiring legitimate correctional authority may be ‘respect,
fairness, courtesy, empathy, and a willingness to listen.’ Reasonableness review
encourages these virtues.263
The argument is that correctional authority can be reformed by undergoing short sharp
shocks of reasonableness via habeas corpus. However, this misses the depth of the
challenges posed to correctional legitimacy—indeed state legitimacy and/as the rule of
law—by the facts of incarceration presented earlier. The optimism shown leans on values
of public justification and congruence between law on the books and in action. But it
underplays the intransigence of extraordinary coercion and violence in Canada’s prisons,
and with this, the institutional genius shown for evading accountability.264 More
fundamentally, the theoretical connectivity of public reason and legitimate correctional
authority risks covering over the deeper illegitimacy of prisons in cementing gross socialstructural inequality and colonialist subordination.
Is it possible to practice administrative law in (and beyond) prisons in a way that resists
and seeks alternatives to, rather than strengthens or legitimizes the carceral state?265 This
is, in part, a question of remedies. Khela states:

Khela, supra note 8 at para 13.
Davis, supra note 190 at 65, citing Michael Weinrath, Behind the Walls: Inmates and Correctional
Officers on the State of Canadian Prisons (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016) at 157.
264 For instance, while the new SIU regime (see note 112, supra) was held out as an alternative to
solitary confinement, it has been shown to produce prolonged solitary meeting the standard of cruel
and unusual treatment in 1 in 10 placements (Sprott and Doob, supra note 28). Moreover, while the
system builds in independent oversight, these “external reviews do not take place in the usual course
of events until a prisoner has spent 90 days in SIU—well over the recognized time-period of 15 days
when individuals are likely to suffer negative effects of isolation.” West Coast Prison Justice Society
and Prisoners’ Legal Services, Solitary By Another Name: The Ongoing Use of Isolation in Canada’s
Federal Prisons (West Coast PJS, Nov 2020) at 51-52. online (pdf): <https://prisonjustice.org/wpcontent/ uploads/2020/11/Solitary-by-another-name-report.pdf>.
265 On anti-carceral remedies see Parkes, “Abolitionist Lawyering,” supra note 31; Sheila Wildeman,
"Disabling Solitary: An Anti-Carceral Critique of Canada's Solitary Confinement Litigation" in The
Legacies of Institutionalisation: Disability, Law and Policy in the 'Deinstitutionalised' Community, Claire
Spivakovsky, Linda Steele and Penelope Weller, eds (Oxford Hart, 2020). On the related subject of
anti-colonialist institutional transformation, see Angelique EagleWoman, “Envisioning Indigenous
Community Courts to Realize Justice in Canada for First Nations” (2019) 56:3 Alberta LR 669; Linda
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In the Federal Court, a wide array of relief can be sought in an application for
judicial review of a CSC decision. ... But all a provincial superior court can do [on
habeas corpus] is determine that the detention is unlawful and then rule on a
motion for discharge.266
The point is a jurisdictional one: in federal matters, certiorari and other judicial review
remedies are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court. The BC Court of Appeal
states the point more emphatically: “remedies such as mandamus or declaratory relief are
not available to supplement the jurisdiction of the court” on habeas corpus.267 The
principle is given even more expansive articulation in a New Brunswick decision:
a provincial superior court issuing a habeas corpus order is not quashing nor can
it quash the impugned decision and direct a re-consideration by the correctional
authorities (certiorari) or make an independent decision as to the proper
security classification level (certiorari) or compel the authorities to make a
decision (mandamus) or otherwise make a declaration (declaratory order) or
stop the correctional authorities from taking such other steps as they
decide over the inmate (injunction).268
The point requires narrowing. First, the proposed jurisdictional constraint does not arise
where provincial courts are dealing with habeas corpus in provincial corrections—where
it is common to have multiple claims combined (and remedies sought).269 Second, the
strict approach taken in these cases undercuts “the inherent powers of the Superior Court
to ensure that its orders are effective,” and its responsibility to ensure that habeas
corpus “remains a flexible and effective remedy.”270 Whether the decision can be
quashed “is purely academic [as once a prisoner is] released on habeas corpus, the effect
of the detention order [is] exhausted.” 271 Beyond this, precedents, including from the
Supreme Court of Canada, reflect judicial discretion to grant ancillary remedies in habeas
corpus, including in matters arising from the federal jurisdiction.272 For instance,
conditions of release ancillary to habeas corpus have been ordered (in parole and
immigration detention contexts, and historically, in contexts of bail) where “outright or
unconditional release would be inappropriate but where incarceration is not justified.”273
Further, some judges have issued directions—for instance, on what is required of
Mussell, "Intergenerational Imprisonment: Resistance and Resilience in Indigenous Communities"
(2020) 33 J L & Soc Pol’y 15.
266 Khela, supra note 8 at para 39.
267 Chambers v Daou, 2015 BCCA 50 at para 56.
268 Wood v Canada (Atlantic Institution), 2014 NBQB 135 at para 28.
269 AH v Fraser Health Authority, supra note 96 at para 136.
270 From Ogiamien 2, supra note 261 at para 47. The statement quoted is in response to a narrower
claim, that courts cannot order that release be granted on certain conditions.
271 Ibid at para 44.
272 Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2012) 9.1970.
Gamble, supra note 51.
273 Ogiamien 2, supra note 261 at paras 48-49, citing e.g. Farbey et al, supra note 42 at 148, 153-56;
Ali v Canada (AG), 2017 ONSC 2660 at para 40 and Scotland, supra note 84 at paras 78-79.
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correctional officials to comply with procedural fairness.274 Indeed, wherever discretion
is exercised to deal with a matter that is moot,275 courts resolve questions of legality in
ways that resemble declarations.
All of this must be understood in light of the constitutional status of habeas corpus.
Superior courts may order Charter remedies where habeas corpus is the basis for taking
jurisdiction.276 Section 24(1) provides authority to grant remedies over matters within
jurisdiction that are “appropriate and just in the circumstances.” The Supreme Court has
observed that it is wrong for courts “to pre-empt or cut down this wide discretion.”277
What is appropriate will depend on the facts, including what is required for meaningful
vindication of the right in issue, considering the legitimate scope of judicial powers and
fairness to those against whom the order is made.278 A court may also issue a declaration
of constitutional invalidity under s 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 in proceedings
initiated in an application for habeas corpus.279
In Gamble, a successful habeas corpus involving breach of s 7 in the federal context, the
remedy was “a declaration of parole eligibility in aid of [the court’s] habeas
corpus jurisdiction.” This was framed in terms of the “creativity and flexibility” required
“in adapting the traditional remedy of habeas corpus to its new role … as Charter
remedy,” and with reference to the discretion under s 24(1).280
Courts often deal with habeas corpus and Charter arguments in a single proceeding.281
Yet the Ontario Court of Appeal has cautioned against this (particularly where the right is
s 12 cruel and unusual treatment)282 and stated in obiter that Charter damages should not
be entertained on habeas corpus. The worry is that these demand evidence and argument
unsuited to the timeliness and efficacy of the writ.283 However, the foundational principle
remains that courts have a duty to remediate illegal detention through habeas corpus, and
(other) Charter rights are often inextricably implicated.
Where illegal detention is particularly egregious, responsive s 24(1) remedies might
potentially extend to reduction in the underlying sentence. Already, sentencing law
allows that a contemplated sentence may be reduced by harsh conditions in pre-trial

Charlie v British Columbia (AG), 2016 BCSC 2292 at para 34; Lambert, supra note 173 at paras 4551.
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279 Way SC & CA, supra note 153. See also Pearson, supra note 74.
280 Gamble, supra note 51 at para 81.
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custody—whether Charter rights have been infringed284 or not.285 However, so far there
has been little uptake of the so-called “Arbour remedy,” advanced in a 1996 report by
then-Justice Louise Arbour on incidents of abuse and compounded illegalities at
Kingston’s Prison for Women: “If illegalities, gross mismanagement or unfairness in the
administration of a sentence renders the sentence harsher than that imposed by the court,
a reduction in the period of imprisonment may be granted.”286
The leading (perhaps only) example of the Arbour remedy in action to reduce a preexisting custodial sentence is R v MacPherson,287 a judgment issued April 2, 1996, the
day after the Arbour report was released (although neither the report nor Arbour’s
specific proposition is mentioned). MacPherson, on sentence in a New Brunswick jail,
had been banging on his cell door and requesting a lawyer—after 40 days of being denied
access to one. He was forcibly restrained, strapped to a board and left there for over two
hours in extreme distress. He brought a habeas corpus application alleging breach of
Charter rights under ss 9, 12, and 10(b). Video of the incident was presented to the Court
and described extensively in the judgment. In addition, other prisoners gave evidence
from which the judge concluded “that other inmates in the Madawaska jail have also been
strapped to the stretcher for hours,” and that on a separate occasion “an inmate with
mental difficulties whose initials are AB was beaten by a guard” in the cell next to
MacPherson’s. The judge determined breach of ss 9 and 12, and his s 24(1) order
included the unprecedented move of reducing the sentence to time served (a reduction of
three months), as well as requests to the provincial Attorney General to consider taking
steps to make legal aid available to prisoners in jails and to expand videotaping inside
jails.288
A recent, more modest—but still important—example of remedial responsiveness is
Downey and Gray,289 which, as discussed, involved prolonged and indeterminate solitary
confinement pre-trial. While the application and remedy were framed strictly as habeas
corpus and made no express reference to s 24(1), Coady J implicitly built into his order
elements of certiorari (quash and return) and mandamus (mandating a legal duty),
stating: “I order that if a solution is not found within 14 days of this decision,
Mr Downey and Mr Gray are to be brought before this Court for a Criminal Code review
of their detention.”290
R v Prystay, 2019 ABQB 8. See also R v MacPherson, 1995 CanLII 3849, NBJ No 277 (QL) (CA):
appellant arrested on a weekend and deprived of timely access to a judge in breach of Criminal Code
and s 9 of the Charter. A s 24(1) remedy was awarded on appeal from sentence: reduction of sixmonth sentence by three months. MacPherson’s further challenge a few months later, using habeas
corpus to challenge incidents of ill treatment post-sentence on a separate conviction, is described
below.
285 R v Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6. (“state misconduct which does not amount to a Charter breach but
which impacts the offender may also be a relevant factor in crafting a fit sentence” at para 2).
286 Arbour Report, supra note 9, at Part 3.2.2. Michael Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls (Vancouver:
Douglas & McIntyre, 2002) at 583-86, gives examples of how the Arbour Remedy might be used
where full release would be unlikely.
287 R v MacPherson, 1996 CanLII 10188, 177 NBR (2d) 1 (QB) [MacPherson].
288 MacPherson, ibid at paras 50, 51.
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That is, if authorities do not find an alternative, the judge will revisit bail.
As judges already employ ancillary remedies to effectuate release from detention, it is
worth considering how far they might go to fashion terms necessary to sustain release—
on the idea that liberty may in some cases require responsive supports.291 Laying a
foundation for such a remedy might be assisted by establishing a s 15 (equality) breach in
addition to the ss 7, 9, or 12 infringements more typically engaged by illegal detention.
That is, establishing that race, Indigeneity, disability, gender, or gender identity has
functioned as a vector of oppression, concentrating restrictions and force on the body of
the habeas corpus applicant with special intensity, may help signal the need for a remedy
responsive not simply to ephemeral liberty restriction but sustained structural inequality.
In important cases not involving habeas corpus, s 24(1) has been used to grant creative
mandamus-like remedies in the face of state recalcitrance—even, following DoucetBoudreau, maintaining an oversight function for the judge.292 A recent judgment from the
Ontario Court of Appeal—not habeas corpus but rather a statutory appeal of a decision of
the Ontario Criminal Code Review Board—is also instructive. Shortt (Re) involved a
man held in forensic hospital for six years beyond the point conditional release would
have been possible had funded community supports been offered. The Court determined
a breach of s 7 liberty and ordered as s 24(1) remedy a further Review Board hearing and,
assuming conditional release, that Ontario provide Shortt with supportive housing.293
That the remedial order engaged the budget of a government ministry not directly
responsible for administration of the detention order is of special note to those litigating
(or languishing) at the corrections/community services divide.294
Of course, a habeas corpus application is not a public inquiry. It is designed for swift
justice. But where the writ threatens to be more like a revolving door than a gateway to
release—or where the actions complained of are fundamentally corrosive of the stated
purposes of the underlying sentence/detention order—then it is time to revisit remedies.
With that in mind, jurisdictional qualms should not preclude innovations like those
ordered in MacPherson, Downey and Gray, and even (though this non-habeas case is a
further stretch) Shortt (Re). That said, habeas corpus has limits: doctrinal, procedural,
conceptual—structural. Prisoners perceived as pushing too hard have provoked intense
judicial anxieties about the integrity of the writ and the efficient and orderly functioning
of both prison and court systems. In Alberta, judges of the Queen’s Bench have decried
the “tsunami”295 of habeas corpus applications received since Khela and devised a paperbased screening process specific to habeas corpus, now subsumed in a broader process

There is always the danger, however, that the supports will be as bad as (or, very bad but in a
different way than) the restraints. See Linda Steele, Disability, Criminal Justice and Law: Reconsidering
Court Diversion (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).
292Doucet-Boudreau, supra note 278 paras 66-71.
293 Shortt (Re), 2020 ONCA 651.
294 Ibid at paras 16-24: “There is no onus on a Charter claimant to identify from what budget their
requested remedy should come” (at para 23).
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for dealing with Apparently Vexatious Litigants.296 Prisoners whose applications stray
too far from the proper scope of the writ (or the judge’s view of that) may be hit with
costs297 and prohibited from further applications “in any proceeding, except with leave of
the Court.”298 These are developments to watch. An alternative system-level response
concerned with both judicial economy and facilitation of meritorious (including,
potentially, limit-pressing) claims would ensure funding for prison law legal aid in
jurisdictions where such assistance is not available or widely accessible.
V. Conclusion
To learn administrative law through prison law—indeed, to squeeze it into the frame of
habeas corpus—is to be immersed in contradictions. Most basic is the contradiction
between the culture of authority and force in prisons (disproportionately populated by
Indigenous, Black, poor, and disabled persons and expressive of heteropatriarchal
subordination) and the stories law tells of a culture of justification. In order to perform its
constitutionally protected function as an escape hatch from illegal detention, habeas
corpus has an integrity critically distinct from ordinary judicial review—yet it is also, in
key ways, judicial review. The core elements examined in this chapter reflect the writ’s
distinctiveness: timely access to the courts, a strict curtailment of judicial discretion to
deny prisoners their remedy, a profoundly prisoner-friendly onus of proof, and a
guaranteed baseline remedy of release. Each element reflects the value that the liberal
legal tradition has placed on liberty and the practical impossibility of amassing evidence
and argument while locked up by one’s adversary. At the same time, habeas corpus
draws on the same well of basic principles for evaluating legality as judicial review. Last,
to sum up a theme woven throughout this chapter, for all its venerated antiquity the Great
Writ leaves space for shifting conceptions of liberty and of the gravest constraints upon
it—a facet of the writ that increasingly brings it into contact with concepts of structural
injustice and substantive equality.299
Those setting out to dismantle the carceral state using habeas corpus are likely to be
disappointed; that is like trying to drive a bus through a keyhole. However, lawyers can
use the writ pragmatically, even creatively—counting themselves successful if they help
just one person out of a tight spot while making a record of institutional decisions and
actions that may otherwise remain publicly invisible. It is one tool in the remedial tool
Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta Civil Practice Note 7 (Sept 4, 2018) [Civil Practice Note 7]. And
see Amy Matychuk “Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench Introduces the Accelerated Habeas
Corpus Review Procedure” (9 February 2018), online (blog): ABlawg, http://ablawg.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/Blog_AM_Habeas_Corpus.pdf (“inmates often identify very real problems
with prison conditions and possible breaches of Charter rights” but “the Alberta courts have
repeatedly responded to their allegations by noting that habeas corpus is an inappropriate means of
addressing these problems.”).
297 See e.g. Johnsrud v Fader, 2021 ABQB 88 at para 9; Hamm 2019, supra note 295 at para 271. See
also Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Alberta Courts of Appeal Restores Access to Habeas Corpus” (April 7,
2020), online (blog): ABlawg, \<http://ablawg.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/Blog_JWH_Wilcox.pdf\>
298 Civil Practice Note 7, supra note 296.
299 Parkes, supra note 108.
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box. For some, habeas corpus may become part of a wider lawyering practice, or ethic,300
dedicated not simply to vindicating the rights of prisoners but to reimagining and
redesigning (and making space for others to reimagine and redesign) the administrative
state in accordance with an emancipatory—anti-colonialist and anti-carceral301—
conception of administrative justice.

Parkes, supra note 31.
See the sources cited at note 265, supra, and see Chapter 5 by Janna Promislow and Naiomi
Metallic.
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